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Abstract

Religious certitude is often associated with conflict between individuals and
groups, though the nature of this relationship is still not clear. To further clarify these
dynamics, the historical psychology of religion is reviewed and contrasted with current
perspectives from social psychology and neuroscience, with an eye towards better
understanding the variance within religious expressions and their associated relationships
with intergroup conflict. It is hypothesized that religious certainty is related to a
difficulty in engaging with contradictory religious perspectives, and that the pull towards
certainty is tied to an individual’s unique psychological structure, much of which is
developed through the interaction of formative variables over the lifespan.
Utilizing data (N=2331) collected during the Forum BEVI Project, a multiinstitution, multi-year project coordinated by the Forum on Education Abroad and the
International Beliefs and Values Institute, statistical analyses consisting of ANOVAs,
regression analyses, and structural equation modeling are used to explore these ideas.
Results suggest that a propensity to identify with religious certitude is predictive of one’s
beliefs in a number of other areas. Further, individuals who report distressing early life
events associated with unmet developmental needs may tend towards belief certainty.
However, structural equation modeling highlights the complexity of this relationship,
suggesting the importance of accounting for individual differences. Finally, analyses
indicate that the variance in levels of certainty within religious groups is greater than the
variance between these groups. It is therefore concluded that accounting for levels of
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religious certainty is more helpful than emphasizing particular religious traditions when
seeking to understand intergroup conflict.
These findings suggest the value of fostering an agnostic theory of knowledge,
and a continuum of belief is proposed to illustrate this concept in relation to religious
belief. Towards this end, interventions meant to facilitate intergroup dialogue and
understanding while respecting individual theological traditions are highlighted.

ix

1
It infuriates me to be wrong when I know I’m right.
Molière

In this time of globalization and collision of worldviews, the need for a deeper
understanding of religious faith is more pressing than ever. Ideologies and religious
systems which seem to contradict one‟s own beliefs often are perceived as a personal or
cultural attack, which may lead to physical or relational violence against the perceived
source of this attack (Silberman, Higgins, & Dweck, 2005; Tan, 2009). One does not
have to look far to see examples of conflicts where the battle lines are drawn between
those of different religious affiliations. A small sampling of recent examples includes the
clashes between Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland, Jews and Muslims in the
Middle East, Christians and Muslims in Bosnia and Sudan, Hindus and Muslims in India,
and Muslim extremists‟ violence towards secularized America and the “Christian West”
(Hunsberger, 2005; Paloutzian & Kirkpatrick, 1995). While it may be argued that these
conflicts also are about politics, ethnicity, or economics in addition to religious faith, the
question of why differences in religious faith often create the borders between friend and
enemy still remains largely unanswered (Yiftachel, 2006). In other words, it seems that
differences in religious belief often are linked to conflict between individuals and groups,
but the why of this association still appears unclear.1
In grappling with this fundamental question of “why,” we examine a wide range
of issues in this dissertation including the psychology of religion, the nature of belief
certitude, as well as the theoretical associations and empirical correlates that are related to
1

Content from this dissertation is included as a chapter in Shealy, C.N. (in press) (Ed.), Making Sense of
Beliefs and Values, and is published here with the permission of Springer Publishing, New York.
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these constructs. We then present findings from a large scale assessment project, which
examines the etiology of beliefs and values. Based upon the accompanying theoretical
model (Equilintegration or EI Theory) and assessment method (the Beliefs, Events, and
Values Inventory or BEVI), we offer a series of data-based conclusions and
recommendations that address the study of religious certitude specifically as well as the
nature of belief certitude more broadly. Chief among these is support of agnosticism,
along a larger Continuum of Belief, as an intellectually defensible and interpersonally
advantageous framework on matters over which definitive conclusions – those that are
empirically, independently, and reliably verifiable – seem untenable. Finally, we
translate this perspective into applied form by describing educational and psychological
interventions that encourage critical reflective thinking about religious or non-religious
systems of thought, with a specific focus on cross-conviction dialogues. Through this
comprehensive approach – which juxtaposes relevant literature with theory, data, and
application – it is our hope that this dissertation may help advance the overarching goal
of facilitating greater understanding of why we believe what we believe regarding
transcendental matters while offering possibilities for deeper and more constructive
engagement with self and others on these fundamental matters that affect us all.

The Nature of Certitude
Certitude has been conceptualized in a number of ways (e.g., Arkin, Oleson, &
Carroll, 2009), but for present purposes, is defined as the absence of doubt. This absence
of doubt, which may result from a complex interaction among affective, attributional,
developmental and contextual processes, seems likewise associated with an inability to

3
contemplate the potential legitimacy of another‟s perspective much less the potential
shortcomings of one‟s own. The tendency toward certitude requires fidelity to an allied –
and often unknown or unacknowledged – epistemological framework with its own set of
assumptions. Thus, without digressing too far into philosophical arguments regarding
certainty, it may be helpful to highlight the dilemma that is inherent in claiming
inviolability regarding one‟s own beliefs (Shealy, 2005).
The problem of induction, for instance, challenges the assumption that we can
deduce from our past experiences what will be certain in the future. For example, if a hot
stove burned my hand in the past, I might be certain it will do so again in the future.
However, this inductive logic assumes that the laws of nature are constant and uniform,
while simultaneously ignoring the fact that additional variables must be accounted for as
well (e.g., the fact that a stove burner may or may not be turned on). As an antidote to
such linearity, philosophers such as Immanuel Kant, and psychologists such as Rollo
May, have emphasized the subjective, phenomenological, and existential nature of human
experience (Towler, 1984). From the standpoint of allied scholarship and practice in
psychology, an individual may not necessarily “know” the complete and correct
interpretation of reality, as if omnipotent, but should instead grant that multiple
perspectives may be valid even if the apprehender regards them as improbable or even
impossible (May, 1983; Spinelli, 2005).
On the other hand, even if someone may not be able to know something for
certain, it does not necessarily follow that one concurrently may not have a high level of
confidence that a particular proposition about the nature of reality is true (Van den Bos,
2011; Vickers, 1988). Some religious scholars have gone so far as to aver that one may
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experience legitimate certainty based on the assumption of supernaturally revealed (“a
priori”) truth. However, this sort of inductive logic appears sufficient only among those
who concur on a particular religious source for their beliefs (Frame, 1987, Shealy, 2005).
Though many are unaware of these epistemological nuances, we argue that reflection
upon them encourages an informed yet humble approach towards competing
perspectives. This line of reasoning has been popularized recently by works tailored to
the broader reading public, such as Being Wrong, which essentially maintains that one‟s
capacity to embrace the possibility of being mistaken is perhaps better viewed of as a
sign of cognitive competence than human fallibility (Harford, 2011; Schultz, 2010).
Moreover, it is not just the religious who are subject to such processes, since the
expression of certitude, which so often underlies religious belief, may be observed also in
the attitudes and assertions of the avowedly “non-religious.” For instance, Richard
Dawkins, a prominent atheist, has declared that the end of religious faith could solve
many of the world‟s most pressing conflicts (2006). In contrast, others have pointed out
the “religiousness” of such absolutist claims and their concurrent hostility towards the
religious “other” (Jackson & Hunsberger, 1999; Haidt, 2007; Himmelfarb, 2012). Due to
the apparent prevalence of these types of claims from a variety of ideological
perspectives, some have concluded that the multiplicity of views present in our
globalized world have created a “postmodern paradox,” which has made the certainty
provided by absolutist worldviews especially attractive (Dunn, 1998; Hogg, 2011; Hogg,
Adelman, & Blagg, 2010). Regardless, whether the content of one‟s worldview is
religious or non-religious, it seems that both of these perspectives often are held with a

5
sense of certitude that prompts rejection of or even attacks toward those who hold a
conflicting perspective (e.g., Skitka, Bauman, & Lytle, 2009; Skitka & Mullen, 2002).
This situation is rendered even more complex when we consider that many people
who hold such views often feel justified by a sincerely held belief that they are creating a
better world (Silberman et al., 2005). The philosopher and political theorist Isaiah Berlin
appears to have had this dynamic in mind when he observed:
If one really believes that [an “Ultimate Solution”] is possible, then surely no cost
would be too high a price to pay for that? To make such an omelet, there is surely
no limit to the number of eggs that should be broken…If your desire to save
mankind is serious, you must harden your heart, and not reckon the cost (as cited
in Murphy, 2012, p. SR12).
Essentially, then, claims which are certain regarding transcendental matters exist
both within and beyond the bounds of organized religion. Why would this be? On the
one hand, expressers of certitude – in a religious and non-religious realm – may
experience a high psychological need for closure (Brandt & Reyna, 2010). From this
perspective, closure requires an a priori disregard for the multiplicity of other competing
claims, with a lack of sensitivity to the inherently ambiguous nature of truth claims in
general, due to the security experienced by envelopment within one‟s perceived base of
factual knowledge. Evidence for this phenomenon is provided by studies which have
found that an expression of certitude often is intimately connected with overt assuredness
regarding the nature and impact of “truth” in the world (Brandt & Reyna, 2010; Hogg,
2005; Van den Bos, Euwema, Poortvliet, & Maas, 2007). For instance, research
illustrates that the degree to which one is able to acknowledge uncertainty predicts the
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amount of negative affect (e.g., anger) towards statements which strongly contradict
one‟s own perspectives, including those of a religious nature (i.e., the higher the degree of
certainty, the higher the degree of negative affect) (Van den Bos, Van Ameijde, & Van
Gorp, 2006; Van den Bos et al., 2012).
Such findings beg the following questions: Is it possible to coexist peacefully
with others who hold beliefs which contradict – sometimes vociferously – one‟s
own? How can someone hold religious or non-religious beliefs without becoming
prejudiced towards those who don‟t grant legitimacy to one‟s own version of reality
(Shealy, 2005)? Such questions are core to the psychological study of religion, as
psychologists ultimately are concerned with increasing “people‟s understanding of
themselves and others...to...improve the condition of individuals, organizations, and
society” (American Psychological Association, 2010, p. 2). From an ethical standpoint,
the following rationale for such an emphasis by psychology and psychologists – as well
as allied scholars and practitioners should be clear: When people are unable to peacefully
coexist with those who hold different or contradictory beliefs, they are motivated to
attack the “freedom of inquiry and expression,” instead of seeking to increase their
understanding of the “other,” which psychologists are expected to promote and preserve
(p. 2; Silberman et al., 2005; Tan, 2009; Van den Bos et al., 2006). As Cilliers (2002)
maintains, “It is only when [people] have a deep understanding of their own religious
traditions and are willing to learn and recognize the richness of other religious traditions
that constructive cooperation can take place between groups from different faiths” (p.
58). In this dissertation, then, we contend that one‟s ability to tolerate uncertainty – and
thus constructively engage those with religious perspectives that are different – is
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associated with a particular psychological structure, which has been formed over one‟s
lifespan via an interaction of multiple formative variables (e.g., demographics,
experiences, culture). Moreover, this self structure is expressed through both conscious
beliefs and values as well as through the activation of unconscious emotional schemas,
which directly affect the holding and expression of one‟s religious beliefs – or nonreligious beliefs – in relation to others (Shealy, in press).

Psychological Perspectives on Religious Certitude
Building upon this introduction to the construct of certitude, it may be helpful to
consider how the psychological study of religion has informed our understanding of the
nature of religious belief. In much of the scholarly literature, the term religion refers to
“narrow, dogmatic beliefs and obligatory observances” (Wulff, 1996, p. 47). In this
sense, religion may be distinguished from more intrinsic forms of religious belief
(Fischer, Greitemeyer, Kastenmüller, Jonas, & Frey, 2006) as well as spirituality, which
often refers to the “mysterious realm of transcendent experience” (Wulff, p. 47). For
present purposes, unless otherwise noted, the term religion is used in its broadest sense,
which encompasses both religion and spirituality. However, in order to have an accurate
view of psychology‟s historical relationship with religion, while facilitating a more
nuanced examination of religious certainty, it may be helpful to overview the major
perspectives on religion which have dominated this field of inquiry over the years.
The earliest psychological conceptualizations of religion tended to be critical in
nature, often seeing it as a defense against reality (Paragment & Park, 1995). For
example, Freud perceived religion to be a form of “wish fulfillment,” which was a
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product of infantile longings for a powerful and protective father figure, as well as an
amalgamation of rituals which were consistent with the obsessive symptoms of
neurosis. Although Freud saw religion as being pragmatically useful in its ability to tame
destructive human instincts, he also felt it tended to promote psychological servitude
(Paloutzian & Kirkpatrick, 1995). Thus, Freud proposed that if people could abandon
religion and courageously face the unknowns of their own existence, human civilization
would be the better for it. Juxtaposing this perspective with our current focus, one might
conclude that Freud believed that religious people needed courageously to accept noncertitude (Wulff, 1996).
In contrast to Freud‟s dynamic approach, the early behaviorists linked religious
belief to environmentally-mediated phenomena, such as “superstitious” behavior, which
sought to impose order and predictability upon events and phenomena which seemed
outside of an organism‟s control. In other words, they attempted to demonstrate that
religious ideation could parsimoniously be explained by naturalistic and behavioral laws.
For example, B.F. Skinner conceptualized religion as a product of reinforcement by an
individual‟s religious priests, creeds, and codes. In a well-known experiment to illustrate
such processes, he conditioned pigeons to exhibit superstitious behavior in order to elicit
pellets of food (Skinner, 1948). Another behaviorist, George Vetter, compared human
religious belief to “superstitious behavior” in animals (such as pigeons and rats), which
arises as a response to unpredictable or uncontrollable situations (Vetter, 1958). Along
complementary lines, James Leuba demonstrated experimentally that he could produce a
mystical experience in subjects through the use of psychedelic drugs. On the basis of this
work, he concluded that spiritual experiences were naive illusions that are explained
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through physiological processes. It is interesting to note, however, that Leuba also saw
this “spiritual urge” as an essential characteristic of human nature. Resisting the
exclusivity of traditional religious expressions, he worked to found religious societies
which used ceremony, prayer, and confession apart from the worship of a particular god
(Leuba, 1925; Leuba, 1950).
Although some behaviorists might have granted that religion could have social
benefits, it was seen as far better for “believers” to lead principled and meaningful lives
without needing the proverbial crutch of supernatural beliefs (Skinner, 1987). George
Vetter (1958) asserted this viewpoint in his work, Religion and Magic: Their
Psychological Nature, Origin, and Function:
The priesthoods of whatever stripe can never live down, nor make amends for,
their disgraceful role in retarding the development of modem science during the
past millennium in Christendom.... Supernaturalism is, in its social functions and
consequences, a dangerous opiate. And, what is perhaps even worse, it
discourages objective attempts at intelligent social trial-and-error, planning, and
even research, and undermines man's faith in his own resources. (p. 515)
Although many were quite critical of religion, other early and non-behavioral
psychologists apprehended religion in a more favorable light. For example, in his
seminal Varieties of Religious Experience, William James (1902) agreed that for some
people, religion could be dangerous and a sign of naiveté. However, through his
observations of a wide variety of religious persons, he concluded that when religious
belief was combined with intellectual rigor (which he referred to as “healthy-minded”
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religion), levels of “human excellence” could be achieved which could not be reached in
any alternative way.
From an alternative but no less sympathetic standpoint, Carl Jung saw religious
experience as being rooted in “archetypes,” which are part of a universal human psyche
that he referred to as the “collective unconscious.” Such experiences, and their expression
through participation in religious traditions, were central to an individual‟s process of
individuation and self-realization. According to Jung, modern humans were vulnerable
to experiencing conflicts regarding the complexities and seeming contradictions of
religious belief, which might lead to a loss of a transcending perspective on life. This
conclusion was due largely to his experiences as a clinician, where he observed:
It is safe to say that every one of [my patients over the age of thirty-five] fell ill
because he had lost what the living religions of every age have given to their
followers, and none of them has been really healed who did not regain his
religious outlook (Jung, 1933, p. 229).
As such, Jung proposed that religious experiences should be explored and facilitated in
order to promote higher levels of human consciousness, which could allow the successful
navigation of the individuation process apart from the boundaries of traditional religion.
In this way, Jung sought to introduce an inclusive religious system, which would
transcend the divisive certitude of traditional religious perspectives. Jung‟s theory largely
has been ignored by the field of psychology due to its esoteric leanings as well as
attendant difficulty with the empirical investigation of its central constructs. However,
his views have contributed to a more positive valuation, by psychologists and non-
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psychologists, of spiritual/religious experience in human development and functioning
(Wulff, 1996).
Like Freud, Erik Erikson (1950, 1962) saw correlations between one‟s religious
convictions and early developmental experiences and needs. However, instead of
perceiving this linkage as evidence for the problematic substitution of religion for unmet
infantile needs, he saw religion as potentially aligning with the most basic yearnings of
the self. More specifically, the religious inclination was a manifestation of deep human
needs to experience a sense of “trust” that life ultimately is benevolent. Erikson also
believed that religion could facilitate wisdom, which was a focus of his final stage of
human development – ego integrity versus despair – and relevant to one‟s ability to
accept the inevitability of his or her own death. Like other theorists, Erickson warned
that religious belief could be associated with abuse and exploitation; however, he
perceived religious experience to be an integral component of mature human
development, arguing that healthy adults recognized and nurtured their spiritual
inclinations (Kiesling, 2008; Wulff, 1996).
From the perspective of humanistic psychology, Erich Fromm conceptualized the
impulse toward religion as an attempt to resolve the existential anxiety which derives
from humanity‟s experienced separation from other creatures due to our unique capacity
for self-awareness. Moreover, he defined “religion” as any system of thought or action
that was shared by a group, provided an object of devotion, and fostered an orientation
toward meaning-making. He also separated religions into two broad types: humanistic
(god as an example of the ideal person; focused on self-realization; loving; joyful) and
authoritarian (god possesses all of the ideal yet unachievable human qualities; people are
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limited in their power; guilt is a primary experiential state) (Awad & Clark, 2009;
Fromm, 1950). Fromm‟s ideas have received some empirical support, including a study
which found that religious commitment was associated with increased levels of personal
growth when the death of a close friend was attributed to a loving god (Park & Cohen,
1993). In some ways, Fromm‟s division of religion into authoritarian and humanistic
types parallels the difference between religious convictions characterized by a sense of
certitude versus those that are held in the context of a personally empowering quest for
spiritual meaning-making.
Another important conceptualization of religion from a humanistic standpoint was
that of Abraham Maslow (1964), who distinguished between religious people who had
experienced a “peak experience” and those who either had not or had become defended
against such a state. For Maslow, a “peak experience” was a period of intense feelings of
wholeness and fusion with the world in which one feels fully alive and becomes aware of
absolute values such as truth, justice, and beauty. According to Maslow, religious people
who had not experienced a “peak experience” were looking to a religious system which
was meant to preserve the “peak experience” of someone in the past, with the lamentable
consequence of preventing present-day followers from actually encountering such an
experience for themselves. More specifically,
What happens to many people…is that they simply concretize all of the symbols,
all of the words, all of the statues, all of the ceremonies, and by a process of
functional autonomy make them, rather than the original revelation, into the
sacred…In [this] idolatry the essential meaning gets so lost in concretizations that
these finally become hostile to the original mystical experiences, to mystics, and
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to prophets in general, that is, to the very people that we might call from our
present point of view the truly religious people. (Maslow, 1964, pp. 24-25)
One substantive critique of Maslow was that his views were based in part on the traits of
figures that he saw as historical exemplars of self-actualization (such as Martin Luther
King and Jesus) without empirical data to support his hypotheses (Wulff, 1996).
Nonetheless, Maslow‟s basic propositions have received considerable interest by
psychologists and non-psychologists. For present purposes, it may be hypothesized that
someone who experiences a high degree of certainty in their religious convictions would
have less capacity or inclination for the transcendent “peak experiences” that Maslow
described.
From another vantage point, aligned with the theoretical postulates and applied
interventions of the psychodynamic school, attachment and object relations theorists
often maintain that the ways we interact with our experience of god are associated
intimately with our historical experiences as well as the ways in which we interact with
others. In other words, if one‟s approach to the divine is shaped by an attitude
characterized by certitude, then this same attitude may well characterize their encounters
with the “other” (e.g., resulting in less capacity or inclination towards understanding and
the ability to experience and express a full range of emotions within interpersonal
relationships). One exemplar of this perspective was Donald Winnicott (1953, 1971) who
saw religion not as a universal neurosis ala Freud, but rather as a relationship with the
divine that is tied to an individual‟s internalized structure for relationships. Therefore,
one‟s relationship with god could either be beneficial or detrimental depending on the
level of object relations maturity through which such relationships were experienced and
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expressed. This hypothesis is still being explored, with at least one study concluding that
there is a strong correlation between the quality and maturity of a person‟s relationship
with god and the maturity of their relations with others (Hall, 2007).
Attachment theorists also have hypothesized that religious commitments to god
may be a form of attachment relationship. Examples of such putative phenomena include
seeking closeness to god in prayer and rituals, using god as a safe haven during times of
distress, and using god as a secure base for exploring the environment. Furthermore, it
has been suggested that individuals with secure attachments form relationships with a
loving and caring god, while individuals with insecure attachments are more likely to
perceive god as distant – or to avoid forming a relationship with god at all. Evidence for
such processes has been found in cultures where parenting style correlates with the
overriding cultural conceptualization of god (Rohner, 1986). Along similar lines,
Granqvist (2007) found that experiences with insensitive parents (e.g., rejecting and/or
role-reversing) were associated with sudden religious changes during life situations of
emotional turmoil. Likewise, Davis (2009) found a correlation between attachment
anxiety and avoidance vis-à-vis one‟s experience and perception of god.
Along similar lines, other scholars have found evidence that some may use their
relationship with god as a compensation for previous insecure attachments. For instance,
Kirkpatrick and Shaver (1990) found that people who grew up in relatively nonreligious
families, and reported avoidant attachments with their caregiver, were more likely to be
religious as adults (when compared to other attachment styles). Also, regardless of the
religiosity of their parents, those categorized as avoidant experienced the highest rates of
sudden religious conversions among the various attachment styles. Regardless of
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whether one is reenacting or compensating for an attachment experience, such studies
seem to support the hypothesis that one‟s religious experience may be correlated with
attachment style, life experiences vis-à-vis caregivers, and the basic human needs that
attachment relations are designed to meet (e.g., Shealy, Bhuyan, & Sternberger, 2012).
At first glance, it might seem that a securely attached adult would be certain of
their relationship with god, whether affiliating or disaffiliating. In deference to Erikson
(1950), however, it is important to remember that secure attachment is characterized
more by the experience of trust in others and the larger world than is insecure attachment.
This observation suggests that a more securely attached individual might be more capable
of tolerating a lack of certainty, which may emerge in a variety of spheres (e.g., Spaeth,
Schwartz, Nayar, & Ma, in press). For example, interpersonally, such individuals would
arguably be able to tolerate the inherent uncertainties that characterize intimate
relationships because they default to a trusting attitude towards the “other” (regardless of
whether that “other” is perceived as a physical or a spiritual being). In contrast, an
insecurely attached person might be more inclined to adopt a perspective – and seek to
experience physical and/or spiritual relationships – grounded in certainty. In some ways,
through such relational “foreclosure,” they might succeed in freeing themselves from the
uncertainty of trusting in the reality of one‟s spiritual experience by “faith and not by
sight” (e.g., as articulated by the Christian apostle Paul in his second letter to the
Corinthian church). On the other hand, as Mikulincer and Shaver (2001) found, when
one‟s secure attachment schema is activated by the subliminal presentation of words that
exemplify it (e.g., love, support), there is a tendency to exhibit increased tolerance for
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out-groups, even when the perspectives of such groups challenge one‟s own belief
system.
Historically speaking, Gordon Allport was one of the most prominent and
enduring thinkers regarding the conceptualization and psychological study of religion. At
the core of his approach was the construct of the “mature religious sentiment,” which he
described as a well differentiated and complex faith which is relatively independent of its
origins in childhood needs, and consistently directive of a person‟s ethical standards, even
though it is held with some level of uncertainty or doubt. According to Allport (1969),
such a framework “never seems satisfied unless it is dealing with matters central to all
existence” (p. 78) and faces this profound calling “without absolute certainty...[as] the
mature religious sentiment is ordinarily fashioned in the workshop of doubt” (p. 83). A
person who holds this “mature religious sentiment” sees his or her faith as a working
hypothesis which gives a basis for values and infuses one‟s life with energy (Wulff,
1996), a perspective that perhaps is consistent with the Biblical declaration that “faith is
an assurance of things hoped for, the conviction of things not seen” (Hebrews 11:1).
From this perspective, faith is seen as an end in itself, in contrast with expressions of
religious belief that are used instrumentally to attain other psychological, political, or
social ends (Flere et al., 2008). Allport labeled this first type of religious belief
“intrinsic,” hypothesizing that it was associated with positive psychological outcomes
(Pargament & Park., 1995). Allport regarded the second type of religious belief
“extrinsic” or “immature religiosity,” which seemed to accommodate psychological needs
for security and comfort and/or to legitimate one‟s particular political or group identity
(Awad & Clark, 2009).

17
In addition to congruence with other theorists noted above, echoes of attachment
theory resonate here, in that religion is understood again as a means to pursue existential
comfort and security. According to Allport (1969), extrinsic religion can address these
psychological needs by defining one‟s particular religious group identity against other
groups through an attitude characterized by certainty. Intrinsic religion, on the other
hand, sees religious belief as a value unto itself – an appreciation of one‟s subjective
experience of god rather than an investment in ensuring that others validate that
subjective experience. Rather than seeking to alleviate the existential anxiety which
comes from a lack of certainty, intrinsic religion revels in the experience of faith itself.
This extrinsic / intrinsic dichotomy parallels the previous proposal that while certitude
may be associated with interreligious conflict, faith results in self-aware and humble
conviction, which is capable, even desirous, of dialoging with those who hold differing
religious beliefs and values (Awad & Park, 2009; Pargament & Park, 1995; Wulff, 1996).

Religious Certitude and Prejudice
Consistent with this central proposition regarding intrinsic versus extrinsic
religiosity, it also was Allport‟s (1969) hypothesis that extrinsic religiousness was the
source of prejudicial and authoritarian attitudes, which historically have been associated
with religion. Although many studies have found a correlation between religion and
prejudice in the past, this apparent connection has proven to be complex. For instance,
along with non-religious persons, highly committed religious persons also have been
found in some studies to be among the least prejudiced groups in society (e.g., Ford,
Brignall, VanValey, & Macaluso, 2009; Gorsuch & Aleshire, 1974; Kirkpatrick, 1993;
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Laythe, Finkel, Bringle, & Kirkpatrick, 2002). Allport‟s dichotomy offers plausible
illumination regarding this potentially confusing relationship between religion and
prejudice. For instance, studies have indicated that intrinsic religiosity is associated with
less prejudice towards gays, lesbians, and ethnic minorities than extrinsic religiosity. So,
it seems possible both to be highly committed from a religious perspective but also highly
intrinsic, and thus less prejudiced towards others. On the other hand, it may be that
highly intrinsic religious persons may simply be more motivated to hide their prejudice
(Awad & Hall-Clark, 2009).
Although a number of conceptual and psychometric problems with Allport‟s
intrinsic/extrinsic categorization have been illuminated (such as its ambiguity and
presupposition of particular religious commitments), his framing of the complex
differences in how people experience and express their religious beliefs continues to
influence our understanding of these phenomena (Wulff, 1996). In any case, regarding
the relationship between religious belief and prejudice, definitive conclusions remain
elusive, mainly because it appears that the type of religious engagement people
experience (e.g., intrinsic versus extrinsic) may mediate the degree of prejudice that is
experienced. Such complexity is compounded further by the fact that religious
commitments may range from very strong, to very weak, to non-existent (see Edmunds,
Federico, & Mays, in press). Hopefully, the below investigation of such processes vis-àvis belief certitude will provide a helpful frame for differentiating between religious
expressions which impede – or facilitate – authentic intergroup communication and
understanding regarding matters of religion.
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Religious Quest versus Religious Fundamentalism
Although Allport (1969) saw intrinsic and extrinsic religious inclinations in
dichotomous terms, they have not been shown to be well correlated in this way. In fact,
some research has supported the possibility that spiritual, psychological, and social
motivations do not necessarily contradict one another (Pargament & Park, 1995). In an
attempt to address these complex interactions, Daniel Batson (1976) added a third
orientation, “quest,” which includes constructs such as doubt, complexity, and openness
to perspective change. Reminiscent of the previously mentioned ideas of Immanuel Kant
and Rollo May, the quest orientation has been described as “honestly facing existential
questions in all their complexity, while at the same time resisting clear-cut pat answers”
(Batson, Schoenrade, & Ventis, 1993, p. 166). Thus, those with a “quest” orientation
perceive that they may not know the absolute truth regarding spiritual matters; however,
they also maintain that asking questions and searching for answers are important aspects
in the process of believing. Previous studies have correlated a “quest” orientation with
self-acceptance, open-mindedness, flexibility, helpfulness, and responsiveness towards
others, while also being inversely correlated with prejudice (Batson et al.; Hunsberger,
1995, 2005). However, such conclusions have been questioned on grounds similar to the
intrinsic / extrinsic orientations. For instance, one study found that while the quest scale
might be partially valid in Christian settings, it may not be for Muslims (Flere, Edwards,
& Klanjsek, 2008). Another study concluded that the prevalence of a quest orientation
declines with age (Wulff, 1996). Regardless, it is not difficult to apprehend the
similarities between this orientation and the hypothesis that a relatively open and
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inquisitive inclination to grapple with one‟s own religious commitments would be
associated with a resistance toward the certainty that “final answers” provide.
As a point of contrast to the quest framework, an orientation toward religious
fundamentalism also has been proposed to explain processes of certitude. From this
perspective, fundamentalists of various faiths typically are distinguished by the following
deeply held beliefs; 1) one‟s particular religious perspectives are the only inerrant truth;
2) such truth is opposed by evil forces which must be fought; 3) such beliefs must be
followed today the way they were perceived to be followed in the past; and finally 4)
those who endorse and follow such beliefs have a special relationship with one or more
deities (e.g., see Altemeyer and Hunsberger, 1992; McFarland, 1989; Shealy, 2005). In
fact, Altemeyer and Hunsberger have found a strong negative correlation between these
two orientations. Although someone with a quest orientation may share many of the
same doctrinal perspectives as a religious fundamentalist, he or she arguably would differ
in the level of certitude with which these perspectives are held. In short, the quest
orientation – with its focus on doubt, complexity, and openness to a change – is
representative of a less “certain” holding of one‟s faith. Religious fundamentalism, on
the other hand, is aligned highly with certitude regarding the inerrant truth of at least
some of its religious teachings as well as resistance towards any change in the way that
this “truth” is understood or followed (Tan, 2009).
Some studies have pointed to religious fundamentalism as the religious
manifestation of Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992;
Hunsberger, 1995; Laythe, Finkel, & Kirkpatrick, 2001). Among other levels of analysis,
this perspective is interesting in terms of the interface between religion and governance
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(e.g., how some oppressive Central American regimes encourage Christian missionaries
to evangelize in their countries). Such findings are consistent with data demonstrating
that people are less likely to question the government after an experience of religious
conversion (Pargament & Park, 1995). Of course, such scholarship has strong historical
roots. For example, and consistent with Freud and Skinner, Karl Marx saw religion as an
“opiate of the masses,” which militated against social unrest. Along similar lines,
Niccolò Machiavelli emblematically suggested that leaders should maintain the religious
structure of their country in order to keep the people “well conducted” (Silberman et al.,
2005). As suggested previously, a religious perspective of certitude generally would be
associated with resistance to political changes within authoritarian-leaning regimes, along
with their theological concomitants, as well as the inevitable cognitive and emotional
disequilibrium that these changes would foster. Although we have highlighted two
perspectives of religious “quest” and religious “fundamentalism,” it should be noted that
these are not necessarily incompatible or mutually exclusive. In other words, overlaps
and variations in the two extremes also exist. For example, a believer may hold
fundamentalist attitudes in relation to certain doctrines, while remaining open to learning
about new or alternative perspectives regarding other doctrines (Tan, 2009).

Religious Certitude and Religious Orthodoxy
As with most psychological constructs that bear on the interaction of religiosity
and other attitudinal phenomena, such as prejudice, correlational trends are complex, but
discernible. For example, Kirkpatrick (1993) found that religious fundamentalism was
associated with five different forms of prejudice, while Christian orthodoxy either was
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inversely related or unrelated to each of these same scales. For this reason, some
researchers have looked to Christian orthodoxy (the degree to which someone has
internalized traditional Christian tenants) as a useful measure for differentiating the
effects of Right Wing Authoritarianism and/or religious fundamentalism from actual
religious beliefs (Ford et al., 2009; Hunsberger, 1989; Laythe et al., 2001; Laythe et al.,
2002). Christian orthodoxy has in fact been shown to correlate with less prejudicial
attitudes in a number of analyses. For instance, one study confirmed that religious
fundamentalism and Right-Wing Authoritarianism predicted negative attitudes toward
homosexual people. However, the same study found that Christian orthodoxy predicted
positive attitudes towards members of this group (Eunike, 2009; Ford et al., 2009). These
findings seem to support a central tenet, that prejudice may be related to authoritarian
attitudes of certitude, rather than the doctrinal content of one‟s religious belief.
Furthermore, recent work on religious fundamentalism suggests that it too may vary in
terms of intensity (i.e., on a continuum from high fundamentalism to low
fundamentalism), with associations to related cognitive, emotional, and behavioral
processes. For instance, although an individual otherwise inclined toward
fundamentalism may not approve of a certain behavior (i.e. homosexual sex), he or she
may still express positive feelings towards gay people if able and willing – affectively
and cognitively – to “separate the sinner from the sin” (Hunsberger & Jackson, 2005).

Religious Certitude and Identity Closure
Other research has attempted to differentiate religious persons by building on
Marcia‟s (1966) emphasis on exploration and commitment vis-à-vis identity
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development. In particular, Kiesling (2008) suggested that spiritual identity could be
understood through the dimensions of “role salience” (the importance of spirituality to
one‟s sense of identity) and “role flexibility” (the extent to which one has considered
changes in his or her spiritual identity). In this study, the “foreclosed” group was
comprised of individuals who expressed a high commitment to their faith, but without
much exploration of other options. For these people, spiritual change consisted of
deepening their current faith. Such individuals showed few signs of reflection or doubt,
and tended to emphasize their relationship with god as their primary religious motivation.
The second, “moratorium” group reported high levels of religious exploration, but had
not arrived at a place of commitment. These individuals often reported challenging
experiences which were associated with serious questions and doubts. They saw
themselves as arbiters of truth as opposed to authorities, and typically came from families
that did not participate in religious practices. The final “achieved” group had navigated a
period of religious exploration that had culminated in personal religious commitments.
Such individuals were able to describe their spiritual identity clearly and specifically,
emphasizing an enhanced capacity to relate with others, which they attributed to their
religious experiences and commitments. Such individuals also were highly reflective
about their religious ideation in the past, and expected to remain so in regards to their
faith in the future. However, they had experienced attenuation of their previous religious
crisis, and now understood themselves as being more settled and spiritually at ease
(Kiesling, 2008). Thus, among other implications, if high fundamentalism is associated
with prejudice, one potential antidote may be the cultivation and valuation of an ongoing
open and reflective religious framework as a person develops, rather than seeking to
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“foreclose” religious identity via the inculcation of unshakable certitude (e.g., Spaeth et
al., in press; Tan, 2009).
It should be emphasized that a belief in spiritually revealed truths or inspired texts
may well occur for individuals who otherwise lack a sense of certitude regarding these
truths or texts. As studies of Christian orthodoxy have illustrated, one may hold
traditional religious beliefs in a fundamentalist/authoritarian manner, characterized by a
form of certitude which is associated with prejudice and intergroup conflict. However,
one also may hold these traditional beliefs in an open/reflective manner, characterized by
an appreciation of the apparent elusiveness of absolute certainty in regards to any truth
claim (whether it be “religious” or “scientific”). Furthermore, these reflective beliefs
seem to be associated with greater interest in, and acceptance of, those who hold different
perspectives. In short, consistent with such scholarship, the fact that James, Leuba,
Maslow, Jung, Erikson, and many other thinkers grant that a faith journey and faith
commitments have the potential to facilitate generative purposes at individual, group, and
societal levels makes a case against throwing the proverbial “baby” of religious belief out
with the “bathwater” of certitude.

Religious Certitude and Neuroscience
As a final consideration along these lines, recent perspectives rooted in
neuroscience have added an entirely new level of analysis to the study of religious
certitude. For example, Bargh and Chartrand (1999) have provided evidence that nonconscious processes, rather than conscious beliefs, mediate much of our behavior,
religious and not. In other words, deep emotional responses in the brain, rather than
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abstract religious principles alone, may more parsimoniously explain why people behave
as they do towards others (e.g., Haidt, 2007; Newberg & Waldman, 2006). Such findings
lend support to the central contention here that it is necessary, but by no means sufficient,
to understand the content of religious belief. Of potentially greater importance,
particularly in relation to understanding the dynamics of inter-belief conflict, is the
certainty with which beliefs are held as well as why such beliefs have been internalized
with such certainty in the first place. In other words, to understand why some individuals
are more inclined to experience and express certitude in regards to their religious beliefs,
we may need to account for formative variables (e.g., life history, demographics) that are
associated with the likelihood of certitude, or the lack thereof, as well as allied affective,
biological, and cognitive processes that may mediate or at least co-vary with the relative
degree of religious certitude that an individual expresses (Shealy, 2005). By accounting
for such complexity in real time, taking into consideration individual differences among
us, we may better be able to “make sense” of the messy complexity that culminates in a
relative degree of religious or non-religious certitude.

Examining Religious Certitude through the EI Model and BEVI Method
Accounting for the origins of religious certitude – through an interdisciplinary,
measurable, and nuanced understanding of the etiological factors associated with
religiousness – has been called for in the scholarly literature (e.g., Bloom, 2007;
Paloutzian & Kirkpatrick, 1995; Pargament & Park, 1995). By utilizing such an
approach, it may become feasible to parse cause and effect vis-à-vis religious certainty,
and reliably apply such understanding to the individual case. Consistent with such a call,
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but eschewing any definitive claims, an overview of the three main components of the
present approach – Equilintegration (EI) Theory, the EI Self, and the Beliefs, Events, and
Values Inventory (BEVI) – may be helpful at this juncture (see chapters 2, 3, and 4 in
Shealy, in press, for a full explication). Essentially, Equilintegration (EI) Theory seeks to
explain “the processes by which beliefs, values, and „worldviews‟ are acquired and
maintained, why their alteration is typically resisted, and how and under what
circumstances their modification occurs" (Shealy, 2004, p. 1075). Derivative of EI
Theory (Shealy, 2004), the Equilintegration or EI Self (see Appendix A) explains the
integrative and synergistic processes by which beliefs and values are acquired,
maintained, and transformed as well as how they may be linked to the formative
variables, core needs, and adaptive potential of the self (Shealy, in press). Informed by
scholarship in a range of key areas (e.g., “needs-based” research and theory;
developmental psychopathology; social cognition; affect regulation; psychotherapy
processes and outcomes; theories and models of “self”), the EI Self seeks to illustrate
how the interaction between core human needs (e.g., for attachment, affiliation) and
formative variables (e.g., caregiver, culture) often leads to particular kinds of beliefs and
values about self, others, and the world at large, that are internalized over the course of
development and across the life span.
Concomitant with EI Theory and the EI Self, the Beliefs, Events, and Values
Inventory (BEVI) is a comprehensive analytic tool in development since the early 1990s
that examines how and why we come to see ourselves, others, and the larger world as we
do (e.g., how life experiences, culture, and context affect our beliefs, values, and
worldview) as well as the influence of such processes on multiple aspects of human
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functioning (e.g., learning processes, relationships, personal growth, the pursuit of life
goals). For example, the BEVI assesses processes such as: basic openness; the tendency
to (or not to) stereotype in particular ways; self- and emotional awareness; preferred
strategies for making sense of why “other” people and cultures “do what they do;” global
engagement (e.g., receptivity to different cultures, religions, and social practices); and
worldview shift (e.g., the degree to which beliefs and values change as a result of specific
experiences). BEVI results are translated into reports at the individual, group, and
organizational levels and used in a variety of contexts for applied and research purposes
(e.g., to track and examine changes in worldviews over time) (e.g., Shealy, 2005; Shealy,
Bhuyan, & Sternberger, 2012; for more information about the BEVI, including a
description of scales, see chapter 4 in Shealy, in press).

Research Questions and Results
This study is exploratory in that we are attempting to understand the relationship
between formative variables (e.g., life history, demographics), mediators (various scales
on the BEVI), and outcomes (e.g., self-reported religious or non-religious affiliation) in a
manner that is consistent with other analytic work with this measure. Analyses were
developed on the basis of a large dataset (N = 2331) collected during 2011 - 2012 from
the Forum BEVI Project, a multi-institution, multi-year project coordinated by the Forum
on Education Abroad (www.forumea.org) and the International Beliefs and Values
Institute (www.ibavi.org). Participants primarily included undergraduate students
(96.7%), although a small sample of graduate students (3.3%) also was included, all of
whom were recruited through a range of learning experiences (e.g., study abroad,
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residential learning communities, general education courses with a focus on
transformative / multicultural learning). The sample ranged between the ages of 17 and
62, with an average age of 19; 3.9% fell into the age range of 26 to 62, with another .9 %
falling into the range of 12 to 17, and the majority falling between the ages of 18 and 25.
Although the majority of participants reported as U.S. citizens (93.3%), non-U.S. citizens
also were included in the sample (6.7%) resulting in representation from 38 different
countries of origin. Of the sample, 79.1 percent reported as Caucasian with 20.9 percent
as non-Caucasian (6.6 percent Black or African American; .9 percent American Indian or
Alaskan Native; 7.4 percent Asian or Pacific Islander; 2.9 percent Hispanic / Latino; 3
percent Other). Finally, from the standpoint of gender, 40.8 percent of the sample was
female, with 59.2 percent male. All participants were required to provide informed
consent as determined by multiple Institutional Review Boards processes, and
participation was entirely voluntary. Participants were not required to complete the
BEVI, and could elect to discontinue participation at any time. Analyses were conducted
via SPSS and MPLUS, and consist of ANOVAs, regression analyses, and Structural
Equation Modeling (SEM). More information on the Forum BEVI Project is available in
chapter 4 (Shealy, in press) and at www.ibavi.org/content/featured-projects. Our data
analyses for this exploratory study will focus on addressing five interrelated questions: 1)
how does the BEVI operationalize religious certitude; 2) who is most likely, from a
demographic standpoint, to score highly on the BEVI‟s measurement of this construct; 3)
how does the BEVI‟s measurement of religious certitude relate to other BEVI scales; 4)
what variance in religious certitude exists both within and between religious groups; and
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5) to what extent do specific formative variables (e.g., family history) predict religious
certitude.

Question 1: How does the BEVI operationalize religious certitude?
On the BEVI, the Socioreligious Traditionalism scale likely is related to “religious
certitude” as discussed above, as it consists of items indicating strong, traditional
religious beliefs, a relatively unquestioning stance vis-à-vis one‟s faith, assuredness
regarding God‟s tangible role in this life and the hereafter, and a fundamentalist
sensibility regarding sociocultural issues. Sample items include:
God’s word is good enough for me.
I am a religious person.
Sometimes bad things happen because it’s God’s will.
Homosexuality goes against God’s design.
I know that evil people go to hell when they die.
Therefore, it is our hypothesis that high scores on this scale will be related to this
common form of religious certitude. Such perspective should be delineated from
certainty regarding transcendental or spiritual inclinations more generally, since this scale
is not a criterion-based measurement of the “religious certitude” construct. Rather, given
its Likert-type structure (Strongly Agree, Agree, Disagree, Strongly Disagree), this scale
is hypothesized to vary according to the content of one‟s religious belief as well as the
certainty with which one holds such beliefs. In short, for present purposes, the higher the
degree of “Socioreligious Traditionalism,” the greater the degree of “religious certitude.”
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Question 2: Who is most likely to evidence a greater degree of Socioreligious
Traditionalism on the BEVI?
As Table 1 illustrates, for this sample at least, regression analyses suggest that
there are a number of significant differences on the BEVI regarding who is most, and
least, likely to score highly on Socioreligious Traditionalism.2 Of particular note, at an
initial level of analysis (i.e., other variables also differentiate these groups), individuals
who report that they are Republican, Christian, or Islamic all are significantly more likely
to endorse a high degree of Socioreligious Traditionalism whereas individuals who report
that they are atheists and agnostics are significantly less likely to endorse a high degree of
Socioreligious Traditionalism. Such characteristics, combined with the correlation matrix

2

Other marital status refers to marital status other than "Divorced," "Married," "Single," and
"Widowed."
Paying college education by oneself refers to the source of college education payment (1=paying
college education by oneself; 0= someone rather than oneself paying for college education). Years of
foreign languages learning prior to college or university indicates the years the participant spent on
learning foreign languages before attending the college. Speak French simply indicates that the
respondent speaks French as a foreign language; likewise, to answer how many days of a week the
respondent reads a news magazine, or uses an online social network during study abroad, the
respondent simply provides an estimation of days or hours respectively spent per week. To ascertain
interest in international education or study abroad, the dependent variable is a student‟s level of interest.
The question is as follows: "On a scale of 1-7, with 1 being „extremely low‟ and 7 being „extremely
high,‟ please indicate your level of personal interest in international education or study abroad
experiences." The independent variables are demographic and experiential variables. Several of the
independent variables are dummy variables: gender (0 = male, 1 = female); “parents paying for
international experience” (0 = parents do not pay, 1 = parents pay); “university provides orientation for
international experience” (0 = university does not provide, 1 = university provides); “plan to travel
abroad” (0 = no plan to travel abroad, 1= plan to travel abroad); “plan to take an internationally focused
course” (0 = no plan to take a course, 1 = plan to take a course); and, “speak a foreign language other
than English” (0 = does not speak a foreign language, 1 = speaks a foreign language). Another
independent variable, the "highest academic degree intended to achieve” is coded from 1 = associate
degree, 2 = bachelor‟s, 3 = master's, 4 = specialist (e.g., Ed.S), 5 = professional (e.g., law), 6 = doctoral
degree. Also, participants are asked about the number of foreign countries they have previously visited
(e.g., respondents indicate the actual number of countries they have visited). Background variables
include “mother‟s education” and “family income.” “Mother's education” indicates the highest
academic degree of a respondent's mother, which ranges from 0 = some high school or less to 8 =
doctoral degree. "Family income” is an ordinal variable that reflects the average annual income of a
student's parents/guardians regardless if the student receives financial support from them. Income
ranges from 1 to 10, 1 = < $10,000 to 10 = > $175,000.
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findings presented next, provide insight into what this particular factor of Socioreligious
Traditionalism is measuring on the BEVI.

Table 1
Background characteristics of individuals who score more highly on Socioreligious
Traditionalism
Unstandardized Coefficients
Scales
Constant
Other marital status
Political orientation is
Republican
Religious orientation is
Atheism
Religious orientation is
Agnosticism
Religious orientation is
Christianity
Religious orientation is Islam
Personal interest in
international activities
Paying college education by
oneself
Years of foreign languages
learning prior to college or
university
Speak French as a foreign
language
Days of a week read a weekly
news magazine
Hours per week using an
online social network during
study abroad
F
R-square
Adj. R-square

B
2.069
-0.302

Std. Error
0.068
0.115

0.314

Standardized Coefficients

-0.044

t
30.547
-2.627

Sig.
0.00
0.01

0.033

0.171

9.608

0.00

-0.303

0.062

-0.114

-4.901

0.00

-0.398

0.065

-0.139

-6.157

0.00

0.707

0.049

0.387

14.304

0.00

0.845

0.177

0.083

4.783

0.00

-0.026

0.009

-0.051

-2.85

0.004

-0.061

0.029

-0.035

-2.077

0.038

-0.033

0.007

-0.082

-4.605

0.00

-0.081

0.036

-0.038

-2.226

0.026

0.041

0.017

0.043

2.478

0.013

0.011

0.004

0.052

3.033

0.002

109.379***
0.373
0.370

Beta
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Question 3: How is religious certitude on the BEVI related to other belief / value
structures?
As indicated above, one of the more complex but salient dimensions of religious
certitude is how it is, or is not, related to other aspects of how people experience self,
others, and the larger world. For example, as previously mentioned, there is a distinction
between religious fundamentalism and religious orthodoxy, with those scoring high on
the later construct tending to exhibit less prejudice and intolerance than those who
express high levels of religious fundamentalism. Given these previous findings, what
might Socioreligious Traditionalism on the BEVI illustrate about the relationship of its
particular form of religious certitude to other belief / value constructs and processes? As
Table 2 illustrates, correlation matrix findings from the BEVI show the following
relationships between Socioreligious Traditionalism and other BEVI scales.3

3

These data represent interfactor correlations among BEVI scales. More information about the BEVI,
including EFA parameters as well as correlation matrix data, is available at
http://www.thebevi.com/aboutbevi.php.
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Table 2
Correlation matrix findings of Socioreligious Traditionalism and other BEVI scales
Scale 15. Socioreligious Traditionalism
Sociocultural Openness (-.62)
Ecological Resonance (-.53)
Basic Closedness (.34)
Gender Traditionalism (.34)
Needs Closure (.31)
Hard Structure (.27)
Identity Closure (.24)
Emotional Attunement (-.20)

How do we interpret these findings? Essentially, those individuals who score highly on
Socioreligious Traditionalism also tend to be:


much less likely to be interested in and open to cultures and cultural practices that
are different from their own (Sociocultural Openness);



much less likely to be concerned about environmental processes such as climate
change or the degradation of natural resources (Ecological Resonance);



more likely to deny basic thoughts, feelings, and needs that are common or typical
for most human beings (Basic Closedness);



more likely to express traditional and conservative beliefs about who men and
women are and should be (Gender Traditionalism);
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more likely to indicate that basic needs were not met in a good enough way during
their upbringing (Needs Closure);



more likely to report that they have few doubts or regrets and are seldom caught
off guard (Hard Structure);



more likely to express confusion or “stuckness” regarding who they are or where
they are going in their life (Identity Diffusion); and,



less likely to have access, and/or be responsive, to their affect or the affect of
others (Emotional Attunement).

Overall then, the more likely it is that one experiences certitude regarding the beliefs
represented by the Socioreligious Traditionalism scale on the BEVI, the less likely it is
that this same individual, on average, will be open to or interested in different cultures,
environmental issues, and other important aspects of self, such as how and why we and
others function as we do.

Question 4: What variance in religious certitude exists both within and between
religious groups?
This complex question is perhaps one of the most important to answer if we are to
understand the explanatory value of grouping people by their particular religious or nonreligious demographic category (Christian, atheist, agnostic, etc.). For example, as the
previously reviewed data suggest (e.g., regarding the differences between self-identified
Fundamentalist Christians and Orthodox Christians), groups that self-identify with the
same overarching category (in this case Christian) appear at times to differ tremendously
from one another in terms of their basic experience of self, other, and the larger world.
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By extension then, could it be that some individuals who self-report as Christian might
have more in common with individuals who do not identify as Christian? For example,
might it be possible that some atheists and Christians actually share more in common
than they do with agnostics, who presumably are open to the possibilities of either
category, and thus are less likely to express certitude regarding transcendental matters?
Although preliminary and necessitating further investigation, several BEVI analyses offer
intriguing findings along these lines. Consider Table 3, which addresses beliefs
regarding the economics of social welfare as well as Table 4, which deals with basic
openness toward or interest in cultures that are different from one‟s own.

Table 3
Comparisons among Atheists, Agnostics, and Christians on the following BEVI item regarding
the rich and poor: "There is too big a gap between the rich and the poor in our country"

Source

Sum of
Squares
17.891
19951.125
17.891

Corrected Model
Intercept
Religious Orientation
Atheism
Agnosticism
Buddhism
Christianity
Hinduism
Islam
Judaism
Other
Error
1358.984
Total
21328
Corrected Total
1376.875
Note:R2=0.013 (Adjusted R2=0.010)

Mean

df
7
1
7

Mean Square
Error
2.556
19951.125
2.556

3.045
3.132
3.189
2.9
3.154
3.176
2.968
3.019
2273
2281
2280

0.598

F

Sig.

4.275
33369.71
4.275

0.00
0.00
0.00
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Table 4
Comparisons among Atheists, Agnostics, and Christians on the following BEVI item
regarding knowledge of other cultures: "We should try to understand cultures that are
different from our own"

Source

Sum of
Squares
11.601
26815.29

Mean

Corrected Model
Intercept
Religious
11.601
Orientation
Atheism
3.382
Agnosticism
3.578
Buddhism
3.568
Christianity
3.378
Hinduism
3.692
Islam
3.588
Judaism
3.563
Other
3.4
Error
942.109
Total
27769
Corrected Total
953.71
2
Note: R =0.012 (Adjusted R2=0.009)

F

Sig.

7
1

Mean Square
Error
1.657
26815.29

4.046
65464.98

0.00
0.00

7

1.657

4.046

0.00

2300
2308
2307

0.41

df

What may we observe about such findings? Due to their relatively large sample
size, let‟s focus on atheism, Christianity, and agnosticism. First, although mean
differences among groups are not large, atheists and Christians from this sample appear
to believe similarly on both of these items regarding social welfare and cultural
understanding. Second, agnostics are significantly more likely to agree that there is too
big a gap between the rich and poor in our country, and that we should try to understand
cultures that are different from our own. Such findings are interesting at a number of
levels, including the seemingly salient fact that a central tenet of Christianity is that the
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plight of the poor should be prominent in the thinking of Christians (Singer, 2009). It
should be emphasized that all three of these groups for this sample – of university level
students – are inclined to agree with both statements. Also, some of the variance in the
rich/poor item might also be related to the moral attributions one makes about the
existence of a large rich/poor gap (e.g. some might argue that it is not the size of the gap
that is immoral, but rather the lack of care for the poor that is morally reprehensible).
That said, such findings are surprising nonetheless, and worthy of further consideration.
Most notably, the intriguing if not ironic finding that agnostics are more likely to endorse
both beliefs, particularly regarding the issue of rich and poor, raises the question of
whether this group may be more inclined toward a basic tenet of Christianity than are
self-reported Christians. Likewise, the finding that atheists and Christians are similar in
their level of openness towards the “other” (i.e., both groups are less open than agnostics)
might be surprising, particularly in light of Dawkins‟ (2006) assertion that atheism is the
solution to many of the world‟s most pressing conflicts (e.g., we‟d be better off and less
conflictual if we‟d but abandon religion), his negative beliefs about Christianity, and his
skeptical views of agnosticism.
Additional context from this perspective may be helpful at this point, since
Dawkins (2006) has much to say about agnostics, dividing them into two types.
“Temporary Agnosticism in Practice” (TAP) is defined as “legitimate fence-sitting where
there really is a definite answer, one way or another, but we so far lack the evidence to
reach it” (p. 47). In contrast, “Permanent Agnosticism in Principle” (PAP) “is
appropriate for questions that can never be answered, no matter how much evidence we
gather, because the very idea of evidence is not applicable” such as whether “you see red
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as I do.” That is because, “Maybe your red is my green, or something completely
different from any color that I can imagine…philosophers cite this question as one that
can never be answered” (p. 47). Dawkins appears to be arguing that the only legitimate
form of agnosticism vis-à-vis a belief in God is the TAP form. Thus, from his
perspective, “even if God‟s existence is never proved or disproved with certainty one way
or the other, available evidence and reasoning may yield an estimate of probability far
from 50 per cent” (p. 50). Here is not the place for a full exploration of why Dawkins
would express such certitude regarding his own presentation of “available evidence” –
much less his own “reasoning” – except to say that many scholars from across the
interdisciplinary spectrum question absolutist rational atheism of the very form promoted
by Dawkins, by noting its unacknowledged assumptions, privileged methodologies,
underlying epistemologies, and internal contradictions (e.g., Eagleton, 2006; Keller,
2008; Nagel, 1997; Plantinga, 1993). Setting such ongoing debate aside, suffice it to say
that abundant evidence suggests we all should exercise due skepticism of our own
reasoning, as it appears subject to many empirically demonstrable biasing factors (e.g.,
Aronson, 2012; Bargh & Chartrand, 1999). From such a perspective, certitude about the
indisputably false status of religious beliefs is no more defensible than certitude about the
indisputably true nature of such beliefs. As Shealy (2005) observes, “believing
something to be „the real truth‟ – even vehemently – has no more power to make it so
than nonbelief has the power to make it not so” (p. 84). Moreover, pertinent to fervent
believers in religion and non-religion,
…the fact that we all possess beliefs and values is not sufficient to confer
legitimacy upon them; that is to say, beliefs and values are not necessarily true,
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right, or better simply because they are held to be so…To insist otherwise is like
asserting that English is superior to French simply because you speak the former,
as do your parents, children, and most everyone else you know. Although the
absurdity of such logic (the non-logic) should be painfully apparent to us all, our
history as a species indicates it is not. Instead, what we too often seem to „know
for sure‟ – with a steely confidence that belies the fanatic in us all – is a tautology
that our beliefs and values are right by virtue of the fact that they are ours (p.
102).
In short, despite all of the emphasis on the putative differences between Christians
and atheists (Dawkins, 2006), such differences are not clearly found in the above
examples, thus creating important questions regarding the utility and validity of
perceiving entire groups of people (e.g., Christians or atheists) either as ineluctably
different or similar in their beliefs and values. Moreover, from the standpoint of religious
certitude, it would appear that individuals who theoretically would appear to be least
inclined toward certitude – agnostics – also are more inclined to believe that that is too
large of a gap between the rich and poor, and that there is value in understanding cultures
that are different from their own. These findings are consistent with the correlation
matrix data presented above, which suggest that individuals high in Socioreligious
Traditionalism – our proxy for religious certitude – are less likely to express a sense of
interest in or openness to issues and groups that are different from one‟s own (e.g.
Sociocultural Openness, r=-.62).
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Question 5: Are specific formative variables associated with a higher degree of
religious certitude as expressed via Socioreligious Traditionalism?
Finally, as we conclude our analyses, an even more basic question may be asked,
which has to do with the etiological and mediational factors that are associated with a
relative degree of openness in general, and certitude in particular. More specifically,
what life experiences appear to be associated with a relative degree of socioreligiously
traditional certitude or lack thereof? On the one hand, mild to moderate evidence from
the BEVI suggests that individuals who report a greater degree of Negative Life Events
tend to be more likely to report a higher degree of Socioreligious Traditionalism. Such a
conclusion is based in part upon correlation matrix data presented above which indicated
a significant (.0001) and positive (.31) correlation between Socioreligious Traditionalism
and Needs Closure, a scale that measures the degree to which individuals report
distressing life experiences associated with core needs not being met.
Despite such findings, the non-linear nature of such causal processes should be
emphasized, as illustrated by the following Structural Equation Models (SEM), which
demonstrate that the mediators of Socioreligious Traditionalism and Christian identity are
complex and worthy of further study. Consider Figure 1, which examines the
relationship between Positive Family Relations (the degree to which individuals report a
happy upbringing and positive relations with their caregivers), Identity Diffusion (the
degree to which individuals report feeling stuck, confused, or lost in terms of who they
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are and whether they have agency to move forward in life), and the outcome variable of
Christianity (i.e., those who self-report as Christian).4

Formative
Variable

Positive Family
Relations
Ethnicity
Disability
Family Income
Father’s education
Mother’s education

Mediator

Outcome

-0.478
-0.153
0.171

Identity
Diffusion

-0.523

Christianity

-0.079
-0.011
-0.009

Note: X2=1964.837, df=124, p=0.0000, RMSEA=0.080, CF1=0.906.
Figure 1. Structural equation model illustrating the relationship between Positive Family
Relations, Identity Diffusion, and identification as Christian.

What do such findings suggest? Essentially, individuals who report that they experienced
Positive Family Relations – and report Caucasian ethnic status, a higher family income,
4

From an interpretive standpoint, Positive Family Relations is a CFA derived factor comprised of items
regarding how positively an individual reports their upbringing and family environment were (e.g., a
positive value indicates a greater degree of positive life events). Ethnicity is a dummy measured
variable; value "0" indicates the respondent is a minority, and "1" means the respondent is a Caucasian.
Disability also is a dummy variable; “0” indicates the person is not eligible to services for students with
disabilities, and 1 means otherwise. Family income is measured by a series of numbers indicating the
respondent's annual family income. It ranges from "1" (Less than $10,000) to "10"($175,000 or more).
Both father's education and mother's education are ordinal measured variables. They range from "0"
(Some high school or less) to "8" (Doctoral degree). Finally, we used WLSMV (weighted least squares,
robust standard errors, and mean and variance adjusted chi square test statistic) as the estimator for all
the structural equation models because the variables have an ordinal or dummy measure.
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and no disability diagnosis – are less likely to report that they are confused, stuck, or lost
in their own life. At the same time, individuals who are high in Identity Diffusion also
are less likely to report that they are Christian. These findings are interesting at several
levels, but perhaps mostly because they suggest that Positive Family Relations may in
fact be associated with a propensity to self-report as Christian when one does not feel a
sense of being lost or confused about one‟s own identity or life. In other words, Positive
Family Relations may be associated with a higher degree of clarity about one‟s own self
and life purpose, which may – for families which are inclined toward a Christian
orientation – be further associated with such status. But do such findings apply only to
Christians in general or also more specifically to those Christians who are high on
Socioreligious Traditionalism? Figure 2 offers an intriguing look at such complexity.
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Formative
Variable

Positive Family
Relations

Mediator

Outcome

0.214

Ethnicity

-0.026

Disability

0.026

-0.029

Socioreligious
Traditionalism

0.780

Christianity

Family Income
0.004
Father’s education
-0.075
Mother’s education

Note: X2=1000.668, df=108, p=0.0000, RMSEA=0.060, CF1=0.976.
Figure 2. Structural equation model illustrating the relationship between Positive Family
Relations, Socioreligious Traditionalism, and identification as Christian.

What does this model suggest? Essentially, it appears that Positive Family Relations may
indeed be associated with a higher degree of Socioreligious Traditionalism, which in any
case, is strongly associated with the tendency to self-report as Christian. Interestingly,
from the standpoint of formative variables, it also should be noted that the higher the
degree of education the mother is reported to have, the lower the degree of Socioreligious
Traditionalism individuals tend to report, which is an interesting variable worthy of
further study (e.g., why would mother‟s education, but not father‟s, be associated with a
lower degree of religious certitude as expressed via Socioreligious Traditionalism?).
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Concluding Perspectives on Religious Certitude
The above findings suggest five concluding points. First, in exploring certitude
generally, and religious certitude in particular, it is important to operationalize our
definitions. As with all macro-level constructs – such as love, intelligence, or certitude –
from the standpoint of measurement and research, an item level of analysis should be a
first point of inquiry. Much confusion occurs in the scholarly literature due to the fact
that different item constellations are used to define similar constructs; therefore, it is
important that researchers carefully consider the content of the items used in order to
properly contextualize the applicability of their conclusions. Future research
investigating the correlations between Socioreligious Traditionalism on the BEVI and
other existing measures of religion/spirituality and certitude might help to better elucidate
these dynamics and consolidate existing findings. Hopefully, the above sample items
will provide a clear understanding of how religious certitude is operationalized on the
BEVI, which may facilitate further such research.
Second, psychological constructs may be understood better by researching who is,
and is not, likely to embody them. In the current analysis, we learn, for example, that
Christian Republicans are more likely to score high on Socioreligious Traditionalism,
which would perhaps be expected, and offers important information regarding the
meaning and validity of the construct. Along these same lines, however, and perhaps
more telling, individuals who self-report as Islamic, also demonstrate heightened scores
on Socioreligious Traditionalism, suggesting that this construct may capture
psychological processes vis-à-vis religion beyond those of a Christian population.
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Third, a tendency toward socioreligious certitude appears predictive of a wide
range of self structures. As the above correlation matrix data illustrate, if one knows
something about an individual‟s beliefs along the lines of Socioreligious Traditionalism,
it is possible to derive empirically-informed hypotheses regarding how these same
individuals are likely to regard other cultures or be disposed toward environmental issues
as well as how inclined they may be to acknowledge basic thoughts and feelings in self or
other. Such awareness also suggests that it is important to regard the “self” as a complex
and interdependent whole that is greater than the sum of its discrete parts, including but
not limited to one‟s religious faith or lack thereof (see chapters 2 and 3 in Shealy, in
press).
Fourth, within group differences may be greater than between group differences,
which suggests the need to eschew stereotypes about religious and non-religious people.
On the one hand, the above data do suggest that people who are high on Socioreligious
Traditionalism may also be less open to other cultures, less concerned about the
environment, and so forth. However, that tentative conclusion is very different from
concluding either that all Christians are high on Socioreligious Traditionalism, or that all
atheists are more open to other cultures than all Christians. Although this point may
seem evident, scholarly and popular discourse (e.g., painting all Christians or all atheists
with the same brush) suggests that such affectively laden labels are highly subject to
stereotyping if not prejudice, which Aronson (2012) astutely defines as “a hostile or
negative attitude toward a distinguishable group on the basis of generalizations derived
from faulty or incomplete information” (p. 299). From that perspective, popular scholars
such as Dawkins (2006) would appear prejudicial against at least two groups – Christians
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and agnostics – and prejudicial towards another – atheists – by erroneously ignoring both
the differences within all of these groups, and overstating the differences between them.
A more sophisticated understanding of the variables that are associated with particular
self-referencing categories is likely to go beyond a descriptive level of analysis (e.g.,
whether one calls oneself an atheist, Christian, or agnostic), instead seeking to understand
to what degree, and under what circumstances, such self-reporting labels apply. In short,
questions of how and why we believe as we do are at least as, if not more, important than
questions of what we believe if we truly are to apprehend the complex and interacting
factors that culminate in “certitude” of whatever stripe.
Fifth, the relative degree of religious or non-religious certitude an individual
expresses may be highly determined, but in a complex, interacting, and non-linear
manner. On the one hand, individuals who are higher on Socioreligious Traditionalism
are more likely to report a strong commitment to a religious tradition (e.g., Christianity).
Moreover, unhappy life experiences associated with a lack of needs closure also are
associated with a higher degree of Socioreligious Traditionalism. However, as the above
SEM results suggest, unhappy life experience are neither necessary nor sufficient
antecedents to the development of religious certitude, since a subset of Christians, who
also report Positive Family Relations, are inclined to be higher in Socioreligious
Traditionalism. Thus, a high degree of Socioreligious Traditionalism may occur in
families that are experienced as positive or negative, although such status may be more
likely with backgrounds that are of the latter (more negative) variety. At the same time,
the tendency to self-report as Christian does not appear to be associated either with a
negative life history or a confused or lost sense of self. In short, although a lack of needs
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closure related to early life events tends to be associated with a greater degree of religious
certitude vis-à-vis socioreligious traditionalism, such reported experiences are neither
necessary nor sufficient in terms of predicting this belief constellation. Thus, in
attempting to understand the etiology of certitude, we must account for complex
interactions among a range of formative variables, keeping individual differences
forefront, and thereby avoiding a “one size fits all” mentality.

Agnosticism and the Continuum of Belief
We began this dissertation by observing that one‟s tendency toward certitude
regarding religious matters appears to be among the chief causes of conflict between
individuals and groups. That is likely because if and when individuals are “sure” of their
beliefs and values, they are less able to tolerate the possibility that they may be wrong, or
not completely right, thus militating against empathic engagement with another‟s
perspective (Shealy, 2005). In our view, the data that we have presented here affirm and
deepen this perspective, by illustrating that we know relatively little about someone based
on their endorsement of a general term to describe who they are, such as Christian or
atheist. This observation emerges from the finding that, from the standpoint of the BEVI,
religious designations may encompass more differences than similarities among
adherents in regards to how they interact with self, other, and the larger world. For
example, some Christians ironically may share more in common from a self-structure
perspective (e.g., their capacity and inclination to experience and express affect) with
their atheist peers than with those who tend to experience less religious certitude, such as
many agnostics. This vexing conclusion likely represents an especially exasperating

48

reality for a subgroup of individuals who self-identify as Christians, since from this
perspective they may have less in common with their brethren than those who do not selfidentify as Christian. In other words, a lack of certainty in one‟s belief regarding
transcendental matters (whether that belief be most akin to Christianity, agnosticism,
atheism, or any other label) seems more predictive of one‟s ability to interact openly with
those who hold other perspectives than any particular religious/non-religious group
affiliation. Thus, although preliminary and subject to further study, it may be that selfidentified Christians and other believers in a specific religious system who hold their
faith without a sense of absolute certainty (e.g., which could perhaps be referred to as
“Agnostic Christians,” “Agnostic Hindus,” etc.) might in fact be quite open in relation to
other members of their religious group. Along the same lines, atheists who avowedly are
non-agnostic (which could perhaps be referred to as “Fundamentalist Atheists”) may
have much in common – from a certitude perspective – with “Fundamentalist Christians”
who also are avowedly non-agnostic. Thus and again, it behooves us to be careful about
concluding anything regarding the basic psychological structure of individuals who
reportedly adhere to a specific religious or non-religious affiliation without knowing
much more about their formative variables and larger belief / value structures, since the
differences within such groups may be much larger that the differences between them.
Overall, then, what may we conclude from such an analysis? From our
perspective, an agnostic approach which lacks certainty regarding transcendental issues
may represent the most intellectually defensible framework on matters over which
scientifically definitive conclusions – those that are empirically, independently, and
reliably verifiable – appear untenable, while offering an aspirational framework that
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militates against shrill diatribes and destructive behaviors toward individuals and groups
who “believe” differently. As Shealy (in press) observes in relation to belief, religious
and otherwise, via the “Continuum of Belief,”
one may be sympathetically noncommitted (i.e., inclined to believe but ultimately
noncommittal) or skeptically noncommitted (i.e., inclined to disbelieve but
ultimately noncommittal). From the standpoint of the Continuum of Belief, then,
“agnostic” encompasses any of the “noncomitted” designations, which is
consistent with the scope and intent of the term, “agnostic,” meaning “without”
(„a‟) “knowledge” („gnosis‟).
Thus, to declare oneself agnostic is to concede the inability to assert unequivocally the
certainty of knowledge.
By way of illustration, consider “Figure 3” from the “Continuum of Belief” as it
relates directly to our discussion (see chapter 2 in Shealy, in press).

Figure 3. Continuum of Belief.

From the standpoint of the EI Model and BEVI method,
beliefs typically exist in a synergistic relationship to one another in that a belief
stated in one direction typically is matched by one or more counterpart beliefs that
exist in relative degrees of opposition to it. Moreover, each belief may be
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designated as 1) solo or paired (i.e., indicating whether an opposite match has
been demonstrated statistically); 2) predictive at the high, medium, or low level
(i.e., essentially indicative of correlative strength in the positive or negative
direction); and 3) predictive of a match or non-match (i.e., whether two beliefs,
and two or more individuals holding them, are likely to be “compatible –
matched” or “incompatible – non-matched” – in terms of worldview) (Shealy, in
press).
So, one may hold a belief (including, but not limited to religious) with relative degrees of
agnostic commitment up until the state of certitude. As noted above, this point is
revelatory in relation to the putative dichotomy between atheism and Christianity because
the labels of “Christian” or atheist” offer little by way of explicating where someone
actually may fall within these self-reported designations. Since within group differences
often are greater than between group differences vis-à-vis beliefs and values, it is very
important to ascertain where individuals and groups actually reside along the Continuum
of Belief.” Revelatory of individual differences among us, and by way of explication,
consider [Figure 3] in relation to Huan, Eleanor, and Ana. Recall that the two
beliefs of [Figure 3] are strongly and negatively correlated (i.e., paired, but highly
incompatible and highly predictive of a non-match between two different
believers). Let‟s say Huan strongly agrees with the belief, God’s word is good
enough for me. Statistically speaking, Huan therefore is highly likely to disagree
strongly with the belief, Sometimes I think that religion does more harm than
good. Likewise, now consider “Eleanor,” who represents the mirror opposite of
Huan, strongly disagreeing that God’s word is good enough for me and strongly
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agreeing that Sometimes I think that religion does more harm than good. On the
Continuum of Belief, if other item pairings follow this same pattern, which is
statistically predicted, both Huan and Eleanor likely fall under “Committed
Certitude” on opposite ends of the Continuum of Belief. Now consider a third
example from “Ana,” who disagrees that God’s word is good enough for me AND
disagrees that Sometimes I think that religion does more harm than good. Where
would Ana fall along the Continuum of Belief? Probably not under “Committed
Certitude,” and more likely under “Noncommited Equivocation.” Consistent with
BEVI data presented later (e.g., correlation matrix and SEM), the fact that Ana
appears to hold complexity in this way – disagreeing that “God‟s word is good
enough” BUT also disagreeing that “religion does more harm than good,”
suggests that she is grappling with fundamental questions regarding her own
beliefs vis-à-vis religion and spirituality, and remains open to a range of possible
truths (Shealy, in press).5
Among other implications of the above scenario, it is important to understand that
both a strong atheist commitment and strong religious commitment – that of Eleanor and
Huan respectively – are expressions of belief. To be clear, then, “atheism is not nonbelief” (Shealy, in press). Some atheists may contend, for example, that a belief in God
is false, but from the standpoint of the larger definition of belief provided here, such a
5

Of course, all manner of variation may occur along this continuum when we juxtapose beliefs at an item
level of analysis. Consider “Luis,” for example, who agrees quite strongly that God’s word is good
enough for me AND agrees somewhat less strongly that Sometimes I think that religion does more harm
than good. Perhaps on further qualitative inquiry regarding how Luis justifies his seemingly
contradictory position, he might express his belief that “God‟s word” contains some real truths which
have stood the test of time, but that difficulties and abuses of interpretation and application have led to
situations where religions sometimes seem to do more harm than good. Where would Luis fall along
the Continuum of Belief? He seemingly would fall at Committed Investment on one side (Sometimes I
think that religion does more harm than good) and Noncommitted Sympathy on the other end side
(God’s word is good enough for me) of the Continuum of Belief for these paired items.

52

contention is still a belief that there is no God. For the foreseeable future then, just as
proof for the existence of God or some other transcendent reality seems improbable (e.g.,
empirically, unequivocally), so also does proof for the non-existence of such an entity or
phenomenon. In short, it is our sense that agnosticism most closely approximates the
apparent reality that in fact, it is extremely unlikely that the existence or non-existence of
God will be proven in a way that would be empirically and unequivocally valid for all
human beings who grapple with this fundamental question. We therefore endorse
alignment with agnosticism, broadly defined, as Agnostic Christians, Agnostic Muslims,
Agnostic Atheists, Agnostic Agnostics, and so forth.
In the final analysis, there are at least two advantages of such a stance. First,
through an attitude of agnosticism writ large, we have the best chance of achieving
openness toward the potential truth or goodness contained in a given worldview, while
simultaneously not eliminating the possibility of learning from other worldviews that
may, on the face of it, seem irreconcilable with our own. Second, this agnostic stance
hedges also against the perilous human tendency toward certitude, by granting that the
beliefs and values we acquire largely are due to deterministic formative variables and
extant contingencies of which we may have little awareness (e.g., Aronson, 2012; Shealy,
2005). By resisting the foreclosed security provided by certitude, we might live more
honestly in terms of the complexities we face (i.e., not knowing for sure, „one way or the
other‟), while simultaneously recognizing that human perceptions inevitably are inclined
toward error – thus abiding in accord with Saint Augustine‟s timeless adage, “I error,
therefore I am.” In short, experiencing and expressing a spirit of agnosticism along the
Continuum of Belief may be the least divisive and most conducive approach to interfaith
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dialogue, since it declares neither that the other‟s beliefs certainly are wrong nor that
one‟s own beliefs certainly are right.
Thus far, it has been implied but should be explicit that our support for an
agnostic perspective is based in an agnostic theory of knowledge, which subsequently
leads to a commitment to agnosticism in our beliefs (i.e., we should recognize that the
validity of all knowledge claims rely on a priori assumptions). Moreover, it is our sense
– although subject to further inquiry – that “absolute certitude” of a religious variety
probably is more akin to a fundamentalist, rather than an orthodox, worldview in most
cases. This perspective is supported by the evidence, discussed above, regarding the
relative degree of non-prejudicial beliefs espoused by the latter group of religious
adherents (i.e., Christian orthodoxy, when separated from Fundamentalism, seems to
neutralize and in some cases reverse religion‟s lamentable association with prejudice).
Finally, we must neither ignore nor devalue the associations between religious belief and
positive statuses at a range of levels (e.g., emotional well-being). In fact, strong
convictions regarding religious doctrines that value engagement and appreciation of an
individual‟s experiential self may lead to more positive outcomes related to psychology‟s
goal of preserving individual “freedom of inquiry and expression,” broadly defined
(American Psychological Association, 2010, p. 2; Silberman et al., 2005; Tan, 2009; Van
den Bos et al., 2006). Further, it also is possible that high levels of certitude may actually
promote a “believer‟s” relationship with others, at least within a similar sphere of belief,
as the above SEM data imply.
So, while religious certitude seems related to intergroup conflict and violence
when it propositions against respect for an individual‟s internal experience and

54

autonomy, such an outcome is not necessarily inevitable. Some less severe forms of
religious belief may motivate a believer to avoid shrill diatribes and demonstrate
constructive (rather than destructive) behaviors towards people of a different faith. For
example, it is possible for a Christian who strongly believes in the doctrinal impetus to
“love your neighbor as yourself” also to be more fervent in this regard than an agnostic
who feels less certitude in his or her obligations and affinities toward fellow human
beings. Perhaps it is the case, then, that high levels of non-absolute certitude – when
coexisting with an agnostic theory of knowledge – may best be expressed through the
term investment as indicated in the Continuum of Belief. This term delineates such
inclinations from absolutistic certitude, and allows room for the valuing of each human‟s
authentic experiential self, which an absolutistic certitude may see as corrupting of or
antithetical to its “truth.”
In the end, our preference for an agnostic stance vis-à-vis transcendental matters
is bolstered by the fundamental point that it appears possible to be invested in one‟s
beliefs while still retaining a non-rejecting and non-prejudicial stance toward those who
believe differently. Certainly, from the standpoint of the BEVI, profiles are not
uncommon in which people are very high, or very low, on Socioreligious Traditionalism
– a common expression of high or low religious certainty – and still evidence openness or
closedness to other ways of experiencing self, others, and the larger world. The existence
of these “outliers” is one of the central reasons why it is important not to overgeneralize
from religious or non-religious beliefs. Even though such beliefs are among the most
powerful (i.e., highly predictive of other worldviews on the BEVI), it still is common to
have all manner of variation at the individual, or even group, level in terms of differences
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and similarities in worldview, a point which should be recognized when assessing and
interacting with people of different religious or non-religious sensibilities.

Real World Implications and Applications: Toward Cross-Cultural Religious Education
In light of the above theory and data, how do we address such complexity – the
promotion of agnostic openness and investment in religious/non-religious meaning
making, as opposed to certitude – in the real world? Overall, we recommend educational
and psychological interventions that encourage critical reflective thinking about the
religious or non-religious systems of thought to which each of us is exposed. As noted
above, from our perspective, commitment both to religious (e.g., major religions of the
world) and non-religious (e.g., atheism) systems of thought are forms of faith, to the
degree that their adherents profess a belief in the fundamental but non-provable tenets
that underlie them. In other words, both a fundamentalist Muslim and a fundamentalist
atheist are expressing their “faith,” since in both cases it appears that the system of belief
to which they adhere cannot be proved in any definitive and unequivocal manner.
Keeping with our emphasis on an agnostic theory of knowledge, as opposed to certitude
of whatever stripe, this stance is not meant to discredit or privilege any particular
perspective but rather to equip ourselves with the skills for reflecting at a meta-level on
why we believe what we believe, in order to facilitate growth, dialogue, and
understanding over time. The aim of interventions that align with these goals is to
discourage any form of religious or non-religious certitude (which appears to lead to
prejudice and conflict among individuals and groups), while simultaneously fostering a
culture of open-mindedness, curiosity, and exploration across the variety of perspectives
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regarding transcendental matters (Tan, 2009, 2010). Practically, our aim would be to
encourage people to “reflect critically on the committed perspective into which they have
been nurtured,” with the goal of expanding their ability to take on personally authentic
convictions (Thiessen, 1993, p. 255). For example, adapting suggestions by McLaughlin
(1984, p. 81), an educator, leader, clinician, or parent might consider fostering an
environment which supports the following processes and attitudes:


encourage people to ask questions, and also be willing to respond to questions
honestly and in a way that respects each person‟s cognitive and emotional
development;



help people reflect on what parts of their perspectives are a matter of faith rather
than universally agreed upon absolutes;



encourage attitudes of empathic patience and understanding in relation to
religious and non-religious disagreement;



propose that morality is not exclusively dependent upon religious belief;



be cognizant of the affective, emotional, and dispositional aspects related to the
development of conviction in tandem with the cognitive aspects of that
development;



respect each individual‟s experience by encouraging the pursuit of their
developing convictions, while encouraging reflection on any facets which may
not allow space for respecting the convictions of others.
Interventions that seek to foster this type of environment generally benefit from

utilizing a dialogical approach that aims to balance both openness and rootedness (Tan,
2010). Consider one such example, as illustrated by the “Muslim Tolerance and
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Appreciation for Multiculturalism” program, which has been implemented at the
Muhammidyah University of Surakarta, Indonesia (Tan, 2011). This initiative aims to
“develop arguments for multicultural Islam based on theological, philosophical and
Islamic jurisprudential precepts, using these to legitimate the concept of multicultural
Islam, and to promote religious tolerance towards the multicultural society” (Baidhawy,
2007, pp. 22-23). Especially noteworthy, this program is grounded in Islamic teachings
that are held firmly by many Muslims. These beliefs include tawhid (the unity of the
Godhead), which emphasizes the need to maintain the unity of humankind as brothers
and sisters based on God as the primary source of all humankind; ummah (living
together), which teaches that all human beings regardless of religion may co-exist
peacefully; and rahmah (love), which refers to a spirit of love and care in human
interaction based on the attributes of “God the Merciful and the Benevolent.” Typically,
programs such as these have been advanced within and across communities of religious
believers. However, we see every reason for those who adhere to an atheistic worldview
to participate as full and equal partners in similar sorts of cross-conviction dialogues,
which might be divided into three overlapping and mutually reinforcing levels –
preliminary dialogue, practical dialogue, and critical dialogue – which we describe next.
First, preliminary dialogue refers to basic inter-religious engagement through
symbolic acts of interest and support towards another religion. Examples include visiting
a place of worship of another faith, or attending an exhibition showcasing religious
artifacts from different faiths. Here, any encounter with believers of another faith is
spontaneous and sporadic. This first step does not require direct interaction among
adherents of different faiths and is the easiest to achieve, but is limited in its capacity for
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building bridges or affecting worldviews. To include atheists within such a paradigm, we
might suggest that religiously convicted people of whatever faith consider attending
various atheistic venues, such as “freethinkers” (see www.nobeliefs.com/) or an
“American Atheists” (see www.atheists.org/) event. Likewise, atheists might consider
respectful engagement with peoples who profess religious leanings within their various
venues.
Second, practical dialogue focuses on cooperation among adherents of different
belief traditions with projects that may not be explicitly religious in nature. The
objective, as Leganger-Krogstad (2003) maintains, is to make common celebrations and
ethical practice possible, understandable, and transparent, thereby motivating participants
to discover common values and essential differences, which make harmonious living
possible. One goal of such dialogue is to decide upon a project that reflects such shared
values, and then, collaborate together in taking action (e.g., working with a local food
bank; participating in a Habitat for Humanity building project). This approach
emphasizes that common values (e.g., harmonious living) are core not only to various
religious creeds, but are shared also by atheist believers, as exemplified by the “secular
humanism” movement, which aspires to be a transcending framework for all these
perspectives (e.g., www.secularhumanism.org/).
Another example of this type of approach is advocated by an Islamic research
center in Britain which explicates how a “civic morality” may be established between
Muslims and non-Muslims, based upon shared principles. In practice, this means
articulating a kind of civic morality that identifies how to treat others well, including the
affirmation of mutual respect, as well as resisting the tendency to discriminate against
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others. This approach suggests that Muslims should treat non-Muslim individuals as
equal in the domain of social interaction, regardless of religious or doctrinal
disagreements. The starting point for building this framework, from the Islamic point of
view, is the body of principles outlined in the Qur‟an and Islamic traditions, including
good neighborliness, charity, hospitality, non-aggression, honoring of commitments, and
doing good (HRH Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal Centre of Islamic Studies, 2009, p. 12).
Such a framework is transitional between practical and critical approaches to dialogue,
since the latter perspective respects and values commonalities (as the above center
constructively aspires), but ultimately focuses deliberately upon the specifics of a
religious tradition.
Third, critical dialogue involves deliberately planned encounters in which
participants discuss religious issues based on theological similarities and differences.
This form of cross-conviction dialogue represents the deepest type of encounter among
believers of various stripes, as it challenges participants to delve intensively not only into
the content of their respective creeds, but also to explicate fundamental issues of meaning
and purpose that are associated with them (i.e., why one believes what one believes). As
this form of dialogue represents the “holy grail” (pun intended) of this approach, we
explicate it in some detail below. As noted under practical dialogue above, the
commonalities we share – across the scope of religious and non-religious communities –
are values that are integral to, but also transcend any particular religion, such as love,
truth, respect for human dignity, and good works. Therefore, as previously suggested, it
seems that one need not abandon strong religious or nonreligious commitments to avoid
prejudice and promote harmony.
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One common approach for engaging in critical dialogue is found in “inter-faith
dialogues,” which are based upon the common understanding that there exists a variety of
moral traditions and legitimate moral differences (Runnymede, 2000). In concert with
this theme, the overarching goal of these dialogues is to underline ambiguous and/or
controversial aspects of a given belief tradition in order to develop religious literacy,
interfaith relations, greater self-awareness, and active citizenship (Erricker, 2006;
Ipgrave, 2003). Without a direct consideration of the underlying assumptions of various
belief traditions – as well as their related commitments, suspicions, and grievances
towards other religious and nonreligious traditions – interfaith dialogue exercises remain
superficial. Although universal agreement may be reached (e.g., as described under
practical dialogue above), deeper encounters regarding ethical, metaphysical,
anthropological or theological content likely will remain elusive without an in-depth
examination of the most basic convictions of believers across the spectrum (Lindholm,
2004, as cited in Van Doorn-Harder, 2007).
For critical dialogue to be successful, we suggest that religious/non-religious
believers seek to set aside any form of certitude that may hinder inter-religious (and
nonreligious) understanding. Guided by an attitude of quest (perhaps fostered by the
relational connections created via the preliminary and practical dialogues as described
above), participants may be capable of coming together to explore alternative
perspectives and interpretations for contested issues in and between various faiths
(religious and non-religious). Examples include, but are by no means limited to,
competing claims or beliefs regarding reason, knowing, truth, contemplation, meaning,
causation, purpose, love, care, compassion, ethics, morality, science, death, the afterlife,
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God, salvation, religious conversion, and the need – or lack thereof – of a religious
sensibility to live and promote a life worth living for self, others, and the larger world.
The objective in these dialogues is not to win the argument or even to reach a consensus
(although this endpoint is desirable, if possible and legitimate), but to understand and to
learn. Furthermore, the discussion should take place within a framework of all parties
stating and justifying their views rationally while respecting the rights of others to hold to
their views and agree to disagree as necessary.
In preparing participants to reflect critically on another belief system in a
productive manner, it is helpful first to foster a degree of understanding and empathy
with that system, which may attenuate critical comments that are based upon false
stereotypes or prejudices. While it may be salutary for participants to question and even
challenge the assumptions of certain religious beliefs and practices, discussants should
avoid inflammatory statements or postures in general. In short, participants need to know
that freedom of speech requires responsibility and accountability, and should be provided
with guidelines regarding how, whom, and what to question in a socially acceptable and
constructive manner, while also avoiding “political correctness” (e.g., hypersensitivity;
affective flatness; denial of difference; an “everyone is right” sentiment), since such
processes ultimately undermine honesty and depth, tend to be superficial and conflict
avoidant, and are unlikely in any case to achieve substantive outcomes at an individual or
group level. One specific model that may be useful in this regard is the “intergroup
dialogue” methodology, which thoughtfully and strategically brings together equal
numbers of “opposing” perspectives and/or representatives of “different” facets of an
issue (see http://igr.umich.edu/about/institute). Moreover, explanation and discussion of
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perspectives articulated earlier in this dissertation (e.g., the difference between
fundamentalism and orthodoxy; what the “quest” perspective implies; the meaning and
implications of the “Continuum of Belief”) also may provide the terminological
heuristics and conceptual scaffolding that are necessary to facilitate such meta-level
reflection. Whatever the method or approach, achieving balance between appropriate
sensitivity and honest conviction is key to achieving both depth and integrity vis-à-vis
processes of critical dialogue. Concretely, participants may be encouraged to reflect upon
the nature of different religious and non-religious beliefs (e.g., the content of the belief
system), the foundation of such beliefs (e.g., the etiology of such beliefs and why they are
promulgated), and the perceptions of the adherents to such beliefs regarding their validity
(e.g., why believers contend that their belief system is good or true).
For example, in addition to contemplation regarding the various big picture
concepts noted above (e.g., meaning, purpose), participants might bore down further by
comparing the various and competing interpretations of „jihad‟ used by Islamist groups to
justify terrorist acts, and by others (Muslims and non-Muslims) who condemn such acts.
An exploration of this concept might help participants obtain a more critical and
reflective understanding of the varieties of Muslim religious expression. Alternatively,
the origins and potential dilemma of the faith-based claim by both Christians and
Muslims that their leader (Jesus and Mohammed, respectively) is the primary
representative of God, as opposed to any other such figure in the past, present, or future
may be a fruitful source of discussion, as can an analogous point of contrast with
Hinduism (many gods, but perhaps from one source) or Buddhism (in which the Buddha
explicitly disavowed inimitable status, despite such reverence often shown him by
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devotees). As a final example, an examination of the fundamental atheist belief that there
is no god and no need for god – along with an attendant observation regarding how much
destruction has been done in the name of god – can be a useful point of contrast and
discussion when facilitated respectfully and constructively. Again, the point of such
critical dialogue is not to convince others, although such outcomes may occur, but rather
to reflect deeply and honestly not only about what one believes and values, but why such
convictions matter in the first place, as well as how an experience of certitude may
present a source of comfort and/or conflict for self, others, and the larger world.
Reflecting upon the importance of such critical dialogue from an Islamic
perspective, Noor (2003) urges fellow believers to “re-learn the norms and rules of
dialogue and communication” (p. 325) in a spirit of intelligence, honesty, and
compassion:
Recognizing the multiplicity within ourselves opens the way for us to recognize
the multiplicity of the other as well. It would mean that we would be able to look
at the West (and the rest) for what it truly is: a complex assembly of actors and
agents, interests, beliefs, values, and ideas that may not be completely in harmony
with each other. It may also help us realize that in the midst of that confusing and
complex heterogeneity that is the other are also values, beliefs, and ideas that are
common to ours.…We need to remind ourselves continually of the fact that the
Western world is far from uniform and that there exists a vast array of Western
thinkers, leaders, activists, and citizens who care for Muslims as much as they do
for their own. These are our real allies and friends, and we must never abandon or
disregard them in our pursuit of justice and equity (p. 327).
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The three types of inter-religious dialogues discussed above may be implemented
sequentially, progressively, or concurrently, depending on specific needs and objectives.
In the end, what seems important is to encourage dialogue in all contexts (i.e., not just
formal but also non-formal and informal), while emphasizing authentic relational
connections with those who hold differing beliefs and values. If dialogues such as these
involve the key stakeholders from all segments of a society – such as schools, religious
institutions, social groups, and of course the state and its attendant political structures –
outcomes over the long term may be moving and salutary, if not transformative.

Summary and Conclusion
At the outset of this dissertation, we proposed that the need for a deeper
understanding of religious faith is of great relevance in our increasingly globalized world,
as religious systems which seem to contradict one‟s own beliefs and values often are
perceived as a personal or cultural attack, which may lead to conflict or even violence
toward the perceived source of this attack. From this point of departure, we considered
certitude, a construct defined as the “absence of doubt,” in adherents of religious and
non-religious beliefs, whether they be the fundamentalist versions of various religious
faiths or the strident truth claims proposed by some advocates of atheism. We then noted
that the tendency toward certitude requires fidelity to an allied epistemological
framework with its own set of assumptions, before turning to an overview of various
psychological theories and theorists, who have expressed negative (e.g., Freud, Skinner),
positive (e.g., Jung, Maslow), and contemporary (e.g., the role of human attachment in
relation to religious inclination) perspectives regarding religion and spirituality.
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From there, we examined the complexity of religious certitude in relation to
prejudice, including the intriguing finding that religious belief in itself may not
necessarily be associated with antipathy toward “the other,” but rather depends upon how
beliefs subjectively are held by believers (e.g., the difference between fundamentalist and
orthodox experiences of religious ideation, with the former group showing higher, and
the latter group lower, degrees of prejudice overall). Along these lines, we considered
the various forms in which religious ideation may be held by its adherent, with a specific
examination of the broader “quest” orientation, which apprehends religious commitment
as an ongoing process that is worked out and understood over time, in concert with the
evolution of one‟s identity (i.e., one may grapple with one‟s religious / spiritual
perspectives over the course of one‟s life). Among other aspects related to the etiology of
certitude, we examined those from neuroscience, which offer tantalizing clues regarding
the affectively mediated bias that seems tied to a sense of certainty regarding one‟s
religious or non-religious beliefs.
At this point, we turned our attention to the overarching model and method that
represented the investigative core of this dissertation, first by providing a brief overview
of Equilintegration (EI) Theory and the EI Self, as well as the Beliefs, Events, and Values
Inventory (BEVI). Following this overview, we offered a series of data-based findings
from a multi-institution assessment of learning project, which resulted in five concluding
points. First, in exploring certitude generally, and religious certitude in particular, it is
important to operationalize our definitions carefully. Second, psychological constructs
may be more deeply understood by researching the characteristics of who is, and is not,
likely to embody them. Third, a tendency toward socioreligiously traditional certitude
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generally is tied to a wide range of other belief structures (e.g., regarding other cultures as
well as the natural world). Fourth, within-group-differences may be greater than
between-group-differences when dividing people by religious / non-religious
identification, which suggests the need to eschew surface level analyses of religious and
non-religious people both in scholarly and lay discourse. Fifth, the relative degree of
religious or non-religious certitude an individual expresses may largely be determined by
a range of formative variables, but in a complex, interacting, and non-linear manner. On
the basis of such findings, and in light of the original goals of this dissertation, we
suggest that an agnostic stance along the “Continuum of Belief” may represent the most
intellectually defensible framework regarding matters over which scientifically definitive
conclusions – those that are empirically, independently, and reliably verifiable – seem
untenable, while offering an aspirational framework that mitigates against shrill diatribes
and destructive behaviors toward individuals and groups who “believe” differently.
Finally, in rounding out our discussion, we attempted to translate this perspective
into applied form by describing educational and psychological interventions that
encourage critical and reflective thinking about religious or non-religious systems of
thought, with a specific focus on cross-conviction dialogues which may be divided into
three overlapping and mutually reinforcing levels: preliminary, practical, and critical. By
providing descriptive information and examples of each of these types of crossconviction dialogues, it is our hope that this dissertation may help advance the
overarching goal of facilitating greater openness, reflection, and understanding among the
adherents of various belief systems, whether they be religious or non-religious.
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In the final analysis, what is recommended most is the cultivation of a culture of
humble curiosity and respectful exploration in which individuals may interact with those
who hold a different religious or non-religious perspective in an honest, authentic,
inquiring, and intellectually responsible manner. Perhaps, if we strive to nurture psyches
that are less inclined toward certitude, human beings will be freer to exercise religious
faith or non-religious faith on the basis of a richly earned awareness of why one does or
does not believe as one does. By bravely accepting that definitive claims seem untenable
– particularly regarding matters that appear to transcend the bounds of empirical
reasoning – we may best be prepared for open engagement with self, others, and the
larger world. Hopefully, such a caring, candid, and committed stance may help us to
navigate more authentically the mysteries that are integral to our lived experience
together.
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education. International Journal of Children’s Spirituality, 11 (1), 137-150.

This article argues that the current approach to religious education in England,
which emphasizes religious pluralism and “moral homogeneity,” is inadequate in
addressing the growing challenge of religious extremism. The author argues
instead for an approach which grants that world religions have distinct
differences, and thus teaches students from the frame of these major religions by
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inquiring into the key concepts of their worldview, and understanding how these
concepts motivate and affect the behavior of believers. It is hoped that by
engaging with different beliefs, that students will be better able to establish their
own beliefs, convictions, and ethics.

Eunike, J. (2009). The influence of religious fundamentalism, right-wing
authoritarianism, and Christian orthodoxy on explicit and implicit measures of
attitudes towards homosexuals. International Journal for the Psychology of
Religion, 18 (4), 316-329.

This study looked at the relationship between various types of religious belief
(religious fundamentalism, right-wing authoritarianism, and Christian orthodoxy)
and one‟s implicit and explicit attitudes towards homosexuals. In regards to
explicit attitudes, religious fundamentalism and right-wing authoritarianism each
predicted negative attitudes towards homosexuals. Right-wing authoritarianism
was also a significant predictor of implicit negative attitudes towards
homosexuals. However, Christian orthodoxy (belief in basic tenants of the
Christian faith), was related to positive explicit attitudes towards homosexual
people. This study suggests the central role of right-wing authoritarianism in
religiously-based bias against homosexuals, as well as the potential value of
Christian orthodoxy in promoting positive attitudes towards homosexual people
among believers.
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Fischer, P., Greitemeyer, T., Kastenmüller, A., Jonas, E., & Frey, D. (2006). Coping with
terrorism: The impact of increased salience of terrorism on mood and self-efficacy
of intrinsically religious and nonreligious people. Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin, 32, 365-377.

This study hypothesized that intrinsic religious belief would help people to cope
with terrorism, and explored this possibility by looking at self-efficacy and mood in
believers and nonbelievers after a terrorist attack. The authors‟ sample suggested
that intrinsic religiosity was correlated with higher levels of self-efficacy and
positive emotions on the day of terrorist attacks. However, when an attack had not
recently occurred there was no difference in mood or efficacy found when
comparing intrinsic believers with nonbelievers. This article also provided a helpful
overview of the differences between intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity as well as the
literature linking extrinsic religiosity with negative or maladaptive coping.

Flere, S., Edwards, K. J., & Klanjsek, R. (2008). Religious orientation in three central
European environments: quest, intrinsic, and extrinsic dimensions. International
Journal for the Psychology of Religion, 18, 1-21.

This study investigated the validity of intrinsic, extrinsic, and quest religiosity
constructs across three diverse cultural samples (Bosnian Muslim, Serbian
Orthodox, and Slovenian Catholic). Interestingly, the construct of a questing
religious orientation was correlated differently with intrinsic religiosity in the
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Muslim sample than it was in the two Christian samples suggesting the cultural
dependence of this construct, favoring more pluralistic and postmodern contexts.
Specifically, it seems that in cultures where there is less tolerance for “religious
switching,” a questing orientation is negatively associated with an intrinsic
orientation, inferring that questing attitudes may be culturally inadmissible.
Finally, this article provided some preliminary evidence suggesting that the
extrinsic religiosity construct might be subdivided into a two separate components
(a religious one and a psychological one).

Ford, T. E., Brignall, T., VanValey, T. L., & Makalu‟s, M. J. (2009). The unmaking of
prejudice: How Christian beliefs relate to attitudes toward homosexuals. Journal
for the Scientific Study of Religion, 48 (1), 146-160.

Through two studies Ford and colleagues investigated the hypothesis that
orthodox Christian beliefs discourage feelings of prejudice against others, and
lead to self-critical emotions when one acts in a prejudicial manner. The first
study provided evidence that orthodox Christian beliefs are correlated with a
desire to act without prejudice towards homosexual people as well as AfricanAmericans when controlling for the effects of Right Wing Authoritarianism and
political conservatism. In addition, the second study‟s results suggested that
Christian orthodoxy is not related to attitudes towards homosexual practices.
These studies support the contention that it is the merging of socially conservative
political beliefs with religious beliefs that best explains the often cited
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relationship between religion and prejudice. In fact, these findings suggest that
orthodox Christian beliefs might actually protect against prejudice attitudes and
behaviors in believers.

Frame, J. M. (1987). The doctrine of the knowledge of god. Phillipsburg, NJ:
Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company.

This is a book by a Christian presuppositional theologian, who argues that one can
start from the assumption that the Christian Bible is true, and thus build certain
knowledge from that basis. Since the God described in the Christian Bible is the
ultimate source of truth (according to the author), a believer who has a
relationship with this God can have certainty. That is, if one receives knowledge
from the source of truth, then they can be certain of that knowledge.

Freud, S. (1961). The future of an illusion (J. Strachey, Trans.). New York: W. W. Norton
& Company.

In this classic work, Freud argues that religion is an illusion based in one‟s unmet
childhood needs for protection and love from one‟s father. According to Freud,
by believing in an all-powerful and benevolent father (god), one is able to address
one‟s underlying fears regarding life. He continues by describing religious belief
in the terms of a universal neurosis or psychiatric delusion, which is essentially in
conflict with reality. Later in the book, he discusses the conflicts between science
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and religion, and ultimately concludes that just because science may not be
capable of providing us with a transcendent meaning, that does not mean that we
should look for it in the delusion of religion.

Fromm, E. (1950). Psychoanalysis and religion. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

In this book, Fromm argues that it is more helpful to understand the ways in
which humans believe, rather than to focus on the content of their faith
perspectives. He frames this approach by separating religious belief into
“humanistic” and “authoritarian” subtypes. He also expands the definition of
religion to include atheism, arguing that religion is any framework that helps
humans to make meaning in light of their experiences of existential anxiety.
Finally, he argues that psychology is not a threat to religion, and that instead
psychologists should see religion (in its “humanistic” form) as beneficial to
human well-being.

Gorsuch, R. L., & Aleshire, D. (1974). Christian faith and ethnic prejudice: A review and
interpretation of research. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 13 (3), 281307.

This literature review concluded that the average church member is more
ethnically prejudiced than the average attending non-member (because he/she is
“nontheologically motivated”). However, church members that are highly active
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in the church were found to be as non-prejudicial as attending non-members.
Thus, the authors concluded that the holding of a strong value position, that
removes one from the society at large, is advantageous in the adoption of a nonprejudicial perspective. Further, the review noted that the more intrinsically
religious, nonfundamentalistic, and theologically discriminating a person is, the
less prejudiced they tend to be.

Granqvist, P. (2007). Examining relations among attachment, religiosity, and new age
spirituality using the adult attachment interview. Developmental Psychopathology,
43 (3), 590-601.

In addition to the study itself, this article provided a nice review of the literature
on the relationship between religiosity and attachment theory. For instance,
religious people may seek closeness to God in prayer and rituals, use God as a
safe haven during distress, as well as use God as a secure base for exploring the
environment. Some have even theorized that individuals with secure attachments
tend to form relationships with a loving and caring God, while individuals with
insecure attachments are more likely to perceive God as distant or not form a
relationship with God at all. This study looked at adult attachment styles and
compared them with various forms of religious phenomenon. The results suggest
that experiences with insensitive parents (e.g., rejecting and/or role-reversing)
may be associated with sudden religious changes (such as conversions) during life
situations of emotional turmoil. Further, disorganized attachment may be
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associated with the holding of “New Age” beliefs (e.g., personal contact with the
dead, spiritual possession, nontheistic/paranormal experiences).

Haidt, J. (2007, September 22). Moral psychology and the misunderstanding of religion.
Retrieved from http://www.edge.org/3rd_culture/haidt07/haidt07_index.html

This article outlines the scientific discoveries that have contributed to our modern
understanding that emotional processes are more predictive of behavior than our
conscious thoughts or beliefs. Haidt‟s theory regarding the five foundations of
morality is also reviewed, which suggests that self-identified liberals value only
fairness/reciprocity (a‟ la Lawrence Kohlburg) and harm/care for others (a‟ la
Carol Gilligan), while self-identified conservatives also value the moral principles
of in-group/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity. He then goes on to
explain how this may provide some insight into religious belief, and points out the
similarities between the statements of some atheists and fundamentalist believers
in that they both seem to base their perspectives more on belief than on scientific
data.
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Harford, T. (2011, April 23). Why we‟re all far too sure of ourselves. The Financial
Times. Retrieved from
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/9219969e-6a28-11e0-86e4-00144feab49a.html

This article highlights the pervasive attractiveness of certainty from an economic
and political perspective, as well as the presence of the assumptions which
underlie certainty of any type. The author continues by pointing out the power of
certainty to attract followers, and the dangers of being certain at the cost of
neglecting evidence and reasonable doubt.

Himmelfarb, G. (2012, September 29). The once-born and twice-born. The Wall Street
Journal, p. C5.

Himmelfarb draws a parallel between the arguments of modern atheists (such as
Richard Dawkins) and the challenges to belief that William James addressed
during his time at Harvard in the late 19th century. By unpacking some of
William James‟s perspectives regarding the different types of belief, the author
points out that the “terrible simplifiers” (the certain) tend to dominate discourse
all too often, polarizing issues in topics as diverse as philosophy, politics,
literature, and religion.
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Hogg, M. A. (2005). Uncertainty, social identity, and ideology. In S. R. Thye & E. J.
Lawler (Eds.), Social identification in groups (Vol. 22). San Diego, CA: Elsevier.

The chapter integrates a number of studies to make the argument that a person‟s
level of self-uncertainty is related to a desire to identify with groups that are able
to provide a sense of security by requiring significant ideological commitment for
membership. According to the author, these groups allow someone to
“depersonalize” and feel secure in a clearly delineated category defined by the
group‟s identity. Further, group members are arguably motivated to ensure that
evaluations of the group are positive (in order to maintain their positive sense of
self-esteem) and are often also motivated to ensure that their group is seen as
better than other competing groups.

Hogg, M. A. (2011). Self-uncertainty, social identity, and the solace of extremism. In M.
A. Hogg & D. L. Blaylock (Eds.), Extremism and the psychology of uncertainty
(pp. 19-35). Oxford, UK: Wiley-Blackwell.

Hogg, M. A., Adelman, J. R., & Blagg, R. D. (2010). Religion in the face of uncertainty:
An uncertainty-identity theory account of religiousness. Personality and Social
Psychology Review, 14, 72-83.

This article makes the argument that religions have unique characteristics that
make them particularly well suited for relieving a person‟s self-uncertainty. For
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instance, religions provide answers for the most basic questions of human
existence, such as one‟s purpose. They also utilize rituals and ceremonies, and
provide moral guidelines that give someone a course for purposeful living. These
characteristics of religions are particularly powerful in their ability to provide a
sense of security, according to the authors, when they are absolutistic.

HRH Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal Centre of Islamic Studies (2009). Contextualising Islam
in Britain: exploratory perspectives. A project by the University of Cambridge in
association with the Universities of Exeter and Westminster. Cambridge: Centre
of Islamic Studies.

This white paper, developed primarily by the Centre for Islamic Studies at
Cambridge University, reviews the characteristics of Islam as it is expressed in
Britain as well as the political and socio-economic factors which lead to its
acceptance or exclusion. The report also reflects on the interaction between
Islamic theologies and the pluralist secular zeitgeist which currently pervades the
country. The authors ultimately argue that there is great overlap between Islamic
beliefs and the “secular” values of equality, respect for the rights of others, and
the rejection of discrimination. For this reason, they feel that Muslims can thrive
in a procedurally secular environment while remaining true to their beliefs.
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Hunsberger, B. (1989). A short version of the Christian orthodoxy scale. Journal for the
Scientific Study of Religion, 28 (3), 360-365.

This article introduces a short version of the Christian Orthodoxy scale, and
describes the strengths and weaknesses of using the short versus the long version.
It also provides a review of the psychometrics of the original Christian Orthodoxy
scale, as well as its relationship with other constructs (such as Right-Wing
Authoritarianism).

Hunsberger, B. (1995). Religion and prejudice: The role of religious fundamentalism,
quest, and right-wing authoritarianism. Journal of Social Issues, 51 (2), 113-129.

This work highlights how the findings on religion‟s relationship with prejudice
are positive, negative, and even curvilinear (in light of the validity challenges to
some of Allport‟s measures of religiosity). Newer conceptualizations of religious
orientation such as quest and religious fundamentalism focus more on the ways
religious beliefs are held rather than the content of the beliefs. The authors see
the quest orientation as effectively being the opposite of religious
fundamentalism. They also highlight how confronting fundamentalist believers
with the consequences of their orientation may lower their prejudice. Finally, the
authors call for additional work focused on investigating the complex relationship
between fundamentalism and prejudice.
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Hunsberger, B., & Jackson, L. M. (2005).Religion, meaning, and prejudice. Journal of
Social Issues, 61 (4), 807-826.

This article provides a helpful summary of intrinsic, extrinsic, quest, and religious
fundamentalist orientations as well as some of the ways that religiosity has been
related to violence and conflict. Further, the idea of high versus low religious
fundamentalism is described, as well as each type of fundamentalism‟s possible
correlations to more or less complex thought processes. Social Identity Theory is
also reviewed, along with its claims that people maintain and enhance self-esteem
through downward comparisons with other groups. Finally, the article suggests
that even though a person may not approve of a certain behavior (such as
homosexual sex), he or she may still express positive feelings towards its
participants (homosexual people).

Ipgrave, J. (2003). Dialogue, citizenship, and religious education. In R. Jackson (Ed.),
International perspectives on citizenship, education and religious diversity (pp.
147-168). London: Routledge Falmer.

Jackson, L. M., & Hunsberger, B. (1999). An intergroup perspective on religion and
prejudice. Journal of the Scientific Study of Religion, 38 (4), 509-523.

Through empirical examinations of prejudicial attitudes towards religious and
non-religious others, Jackson and Hunsberger investigate the contention that
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religious groups tend to promote prejudice towards out-groups. Most
interestingly, the results of these studies could be interpreted to infer that those
who are more religious (i.e. more certain of their belief system) tend to be
prejudiced towards people of different religious orientations regardless of the
content of their doctrine (e.g. religious fundamentalism, Christian orthodoxy,
intrinsic, extrinsic). Even among atheists, the authors found prejudice towards
“believers.” The authors conclude that the dynamics between religious groups
parallel those found in other intergroup relations, where one‟s fusion with the
group enhances self-esteem, thus leading to antagonism towards out-groups which
are a threat to one‟s bolstered sense of security.

James, W. (1902).The varieties of religious experience: A study in human nature.
Cambridge, MA: The Riverside Press.

In this seminal work, William James explores religion and spirituality from a
variety of different perspectives based on his experiences with various religions
expressions. He also discusses his theory of “healthy-minded” religion,
contrasting it with dogmatism. Ultimately, he concludes with the hypothesis that
a higher power communicates through the human‟s subconscious self, and thus
makes an impact on physical reality through humans. He argues that belief in a
supernatural reality, beyond the reach of physics or biology, respects the human
experience in a way that purely empirical scientific perspective (to the exclusion
of the supernatural) does not.
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Jung, C. G. (1933). Modern man in search of his soul. Orlando, FL: Harcourt, Inc.

In this classic work, Jung describes his theory of archetypes which he argues exist
in the human unconscious, and can be seen reflected in religious and spiritual
beliefs. He describes religious/spiritual belief as a search for meaning, and sees
modern man as searching for a new perspective to fill the space left by the decline
of traditional institutionalized religion. His argument is that people need to find a
new source of meaning to help them make sense of life, and that this loss of
meaning is at the core of many psychological problems.

Keller, T. (2008). The reason for god: Belief in an age of skepticism. New York: Dutton.

This book, written by a Manhattan preacher soon after the release of Richard
Dawkin‟s God Delusion, attempts to present an accessible argument for the
reasonableness of the historical Christian faith. It also responds to some of the
claims of Dawkin‟s and other outspoken Atheists directly, and seeks to address
some of the common concerns people often have regarding Christian doctrine and
practice (e.g. that it is patriarchal, prejudiced, and/or exclusive).
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Kiesling, C. (2008). Identity and spirituality: A psychosocial exploration of the sense of
spiritual self. Psychology of Religion and Spirituality, (1), 50-62.

This study analyzed interviews with 28 “devout believers,” qualitatively assessing
the content from the interviews and rating each person‟s level of spiritual role
salience as well as the flexibility of their beliefs. Inspired by Erikson‟s theory of
human development (with his claim that healthy adults nurture their spiritual
tendencies) and Marcia‟s views on identity development, the author suggests
several different categories of spiritual belief: foreclosed, moratorium, and
achieved. While the first stage is characterized by a lack of exposure to other
ways of believing and a general adoption of beliefs present in one‟s family or
environment, the later stages are characterized by exploring other belief options
and making individualized belief commitments through a process of personal
reflection.

Kirkpatrick, L. A. & Shaver P. R. (1990). Attachment theory and religion: Childhood
attachments, religious beliefs, and conversion. Journal for the Scientific Study of
Religion, 29 (3), 315-334.

This study explored the impact of childhood attachment on one‟s religious beliefs
in adulthood. The findings suggested that those with avoidant attachment styles
were most likely (compared to those with more secure attachments) to be
religious as adults (if they grew up in a nonreligious family) or to convert to a
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new religion suddenly. Based on these findings, the authors concluded that
religion might provide a substitute attachment figure (e.g. God) that would be
particularly attractive to those whose attachment needs were not met adequately
as children.

Kirkpatrick, L. A. (1993). Fundamentalism, Christian orthodoxy, and intrinsic religious
orientation as predictors of discriminatory attitudes. Journal for the Scientific
Study of Religion, 32 (3), 256-268.

When the effects of intrinsic religion were controlled for, this study showed that
fundamentalism was positively correlated with 5 different scales of prejudice,
while Christian Orthodoxy was either negatively or neutrally correlated with all 5
scales. Christian Orthodoxy was also only moderately correlated with
fundamentalism in this study, further indicating the differentiation of these two
constructs.

Laythe, B., Finkel, D.G., Bringle, R.G., & Kirkpatrick, L.A. (2002). Religious
fundamentalism as a predictor of prejudice: A two-component model. Journal for
the Scientific Study of Religion, 41 (4), 623-635.

Laythe, B., Finkel, D., & Kirkpatrick, L.A. (2001). Predicting prejudice from religious
fundamentalism and right-wing authoritarianism: A multiple-regression approach.
Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 40 (1), 1-10.
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Leganger-Krogstad, H. (2003). Dialogue among young citizens in pluralistic religious
education classroom. In Jackson, R. (Ed.), International Perspectives on
Citizenship, Education and Religious Diversity (pp. 169-190). London:
RoutledgeFalmer.

This chapter describes the Norwegian public education system‟s current approach
to religious education, a country which historically divided children into different
classrooms based on religious beliefs. In contrast, the current approach seeks to
integrate children from different religious perspectives by having them participate
in activities that require them to work together and build relationships and
understanding. Though religious dialogue is not the goal of these activities, it is
often a natural consequence as the children grow to understand other beliefs by
building close working relationships with those who hold them. Further, as the
children work together, they are in a prime position to observe the similar values
that their diverse belief systems share in common.

Leuba, J. H. (1925). The psychology of religious mysticism. New York: Harcourt, Brace
and Company.

In this work, Leuba describes several religious expressions but focuses primarily
on Christianity, highlighting that drugs provide a similar effect as religious
experiences in their ability to enlarge one‟s perspective and alter their emotions.
He also describes his investigations into the trance like states common in religion,
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along with other experiments seeking to experimentally understand intrapersonal
religious phenomenon. He concludes with the idea that science is able to provide
the mystical experiences that many have found in religion, and uses
psychotherapy as an example of the ways that secular practices can meet these
human “needs.”

Leuba, J. H. (1950). The reformation of the churches. Boston: Beacon Press.

This work provides an outline of Leuba‟s views on religion, particularly religions
that believe God interacts directly with humans. Leuba also describes the reasons
for his belief that the inspiration, meaning, and moral guidance provided by
religion can be accessed through a reformed, secular version of “church.” Finally,
he provides a framework for the basic beliefs or doctrines that this type of church
might hold, as well as the ways in which they might bring healing to those who
are struggling with psychological difficulties.

Lindholm, T. (2004).Philosophical and religious justifications of freedom of religion or
belief. In T. Lindholm, Jr., W.C. Durham, & B.G. Tahzib-Lie (Eds.), Facilitating
freedom of religion or belief: a deskbook (pp. 19-62). The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff.

This chapter seeks to provide an argument for why it is important to give people
the right to choose their religion or belief system, with an eye towards societies
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and political contexts which do not value this right. Further, it explores the
challenges that arise in an environment that seeks to honor religious diversity in
this way (e.g. what to do when the beliefs of one person conflict with or infringe
on the rights of another). This discussion is highly relevant to the topic of
religious dialogue, and it points out the importance of not overlooking specific
religious claims and doctrines as these are often a source of conflict even when
shared values between religions have been identified.

Marcia, J. E. (1966). Development and validation of ego-identity status. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 3, 551-558.

In this classic article, Marcia describes four different developmental pathways that
he argues adolescents may take as they seek to develop their ego identity in
relation to occupation and ideology: identity achievement, moratorium,
foreclosure, or identity diffusion. One unique aspect of this study, in comparison
to some developmental theories that rely only on qualitative interviews, is that it
integrates objective process tasks and self-report measures. This work was
expanded upon by Kiesling, with a particular emphasis on the way in which one
holds their religious beliefs.
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Maslow, A. H. (1964). Religions, values, and peak-experiences. Columbus, OH: Ohio
State University Press.

In this work, Maslow details the unfortunate historical split between science and
religion. He argues that while their relationship is often misunderstood, many of
the needs, yearnings, quests, and other components of religion can be studied
empirically through science. He then goes on to point out what he believes to be
unique about the religious beliefs of those who have had a peak experience
(where they felt privately and intimately connected to a spiritual reality that
convinced them of values such as truth, justice, and beauty). Those who have had
this experience are then contrasted with those who, instead of having a peak
experience for themselves, have instead used organized or conventional religion
in such a way as to defend against or suppress their opportunity to have a peak
experience of their own. They do this, Maslow argues, by following the traditions
and dogmas of their religion, which are tied to the peak experience of a figure in
the past.

May, R. (1983).The discovery of being. New York: W. W. Norton.

This work outlines May‟s existential approach to psychology, as well as the
philosophical perspectives that form its foundation. For instance, he describes
Kierkegaard‟s arguments regarding the relational nature of truth, which highlight
the apparent contextual nature of ideas or knowledge (and the resultantly tenuous
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nature of certainty claims). While May sees the value of other approaches to
psychotherapy (e.g. behaviorism, psychodynamic therapy) he ultimately argues
that we cannot break a person up into their respective behaviors without missing
their true essence or “being,” which is greater than the sum of its parts.

McFarland, S. G. (1989). Religious Orientations and the Targets of Discrimination.
Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 28 (3), 324-336.

This study found that religious fundamentalism was correlated with a general
tendency towards discrimination, with specific discrimination towards women,
homosexuals, and communists. Further, when the impact of fundamentalism was
controlled for in those who were intrinsically religious, the discriminatory
tendencies originally found in this group disappeared. Finally, a questing
religious orientation was negatively correlated with all forms of discriminatory
attitudes measured. This study highlights the importance of differentiating the
content of one‟s beliefs from the particular way in which one holds those beliefs
when seeking to understand religion‟s relationship with discrimination.

McLaughlin, T. H. (1984). Parental rights and the religious upbringing of children.
Journal of Philosophy of Education, 18, 75–83.

McLaughlin discusses the challenge of respecting parent‟s rights to raise their
children in their own religious perspective, and how this may cause tension with
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societies which value pluralism, tolerance, and individual autonomy. The author
then reviews some of the common arguments against allowing parents to
“indoctrinate” their children, while also providing a counterargument and
framework for how parents can provide religious education to their children in a
way that respects their autonomy as well as the realities and needs of a pluralistic
society.

Mikulincer, M., & Shaver, P. R. (2001). Attachment theory and intergroup bias: Evidence
that priming the secure base schema attenuates negative reactions to out-groups.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81, 97-115.

This article describes a series of studies which examined the effect that priming
may have in activating a person‟s underlying attachment schema. The results of
their five studies suggested that priming a person‟s sense of secure attachment
(even if their primary attachment style was not secure) removed any out-group
bias that may have been present otherwise. The authors hypothesize that the
priming of a sense of security activates a secure attachment schema because,
regardless of one‟s background, a person may be able to (at least subconsciously)
recall some instance when they felt secure. However, the authors also found that
when secure attachment priming procedures were not used, a person‟s baseline
level of attachment anxiety was related to their level of negative reactions towards
out-groups.
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Murphy, C. (2012, February 12). The certainty of doubt. The New York Times, p. SR12.

This New York Times editorial briefly reviews the effects of moral and/or
ideological certainty in history (e.g. inquisitions, fascism, terrorism) and the
temptation for society to seek to combat absolutism by responding in kind, or by
limiting liberty or democratic rights. The article resolves with a call to resist the
temptation to seek to control absolutism through authoritarianism, arguing instead
for the subversive power of doubt.

Nagel, T. (1997). The last word. New York: Oxford University Press.

In this modern philosophy classic, Nagel argues for the value of objective reason
and points out the assumptions that often underlie strong subjectivity and
relativism. He sees reason as a universal truth, and an essential building block for
effective communication and the addressing of societal challenges. In order to
make his argument, he points out what he sees as the underlying assumptions of
competing claims, whether they be in the fields of ethics, science, or language.

Noor, F. A. (2003). What is the victory of Islam? Towards a different understanding of
the ummah and political success in the contemporary world. In O. Safi (Ed.),
Progressive Muslims: on justice, gender, and pluralism (pp. 320-332). Oxford:
Oneworld Publications.
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Paloutzian, R. F., & Kirkpatrick, L. A. (1995). Introduction: The scope of religious
influences on personal and societal well-being. Journal of Social Issues, 51 (2), 111.

This article provides an overview of the psychological literature on religion and
human well-being defined broadly, including social challenges such as prejudice.
The authors are sensitive to the multiple constructs used to understand religion, as
well as the complex relationships that these constructs have with outcomes.
Further, they call for additional research focused on better understanding these
dynamics by integrating different branches of thought, rejecting any claims that
the question of religion‟s effect on human well-being has been answered
satisfactorily.

Pargament, K. I., & Park, C. L. (1995). Merely a defense? The variety of religious means
and ends. Journal of Social Issues, 51 (2), 13-32.

According to this article, the assumption in much psychological literature is that
religious belief serves as a defense against reality. This paper seeks to explore
and challenge this view by reviewing relevant research regarding religion‟s
relationship with psychological variables (e.g. anxiety, depression, selfactualization). It provides a helpful overview of the various psychological
conceptualizations of religion that have been proposed, including some lesser
known delineations of religious beliefs such as “control with God” versus
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“control by God.” The lack of secure attachment is also highlighted as a likely
indicator of seeing God as authoritarian and feeling “threatened” if one‟s religious
world view is questioned. Finally, the authors discuss some interesting
perspectives regarding the relationship between authoritarian governments and
Christian missionaries, as well as the relationship between religious orientation
and militancy. They conclude with a call for future research on the factors which
determine the shape of someone‟s religious orientation, suggesting the value of
collaboration between religious and academic circles.

Plantinga, A. (1993). Warrant and proper function. New York: Oxford University Press.

This philosophical treatise discusses the nature of knowledge and the importance
of context as well as the individual thinker in understanding one‟s resultant beliefs
and justifications. Plantinga addresses competing ideas regarding knowledge
(such as those put forth by Descartes, Locke, John Pollock, and those grounded in
Bayesian thought), making arguments for why they may or may not be valid in
turn. Ultimately, Plantinga argues that a supernatural metaphysics is an essential
foundation for a sound epistemology, and that metaphysical naturalism is
ultimately unreasonable.
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Rohner, R. P. (1986). The warmth dimension: Foundations of parental acceptancerejection theory. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

This book seeks to elaborate a series of principles to explain the impact and
consequences of parental acceptance or rejection of their children. In particular,
the author discusses the impact of child abuse on human development, integrating
various perspectives from different types of societies around the globe. He also
highlights the common relationship between societal religious beliefs and
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